According to Teri Kwal Gamble and Michael W Gamble in their publication, Making Sense of Senselessness, ‘…untangling the causes of terrorism is much like trying to understand why war occurs…It is possible , however to explain that terrorism occurs because, like war, it is misleading to treat terrorism as the irrational acts of crazed fanatics. To the contrary, terrorism occurs because many of those who use it consider it a necessary, legitimate and effective tool to rid themselves of what they consider oppression….’

It is therefore not surprising when Nigerians first became aware of Boko Haram, a militant Islamic group founded by Mohammed Yusuf around 2000, as simply an extremist religious sect, seeking strict implementation of the Islamic law, Sharia. But then, the implications of the interpretation of the Hausa name: Boko Haram, which means ‘Western Education is Sin,’ was not lost on anyone.

By the time the sect was directly implicated in the 2009 sectarian violence that enveloped the city of Maiduguri in North Eastern Nigeria, resulting in the death of over 450 people, it became obvious that a major problem had set into Nigeria’s socio-political life.

Tolerated and even courted by some politicians in the North Eastern part of the country mainly, the group was allowed to flourish and grow stronger and more sophisticated before it dawned on all that indeed it was no longer the harmless group that these politicians would have unsuspecting Nigerians believe. Although, little findings have been made concerning the command structure of the group after the extra judicial killing of its founding leader, Mohammed Yusuf in 2009, it is clear that the group has since been divided into factions, with some of the factions having links with terror groups outside Nigeria. Indeed, the links had been traced to Somalia, North Africa and beyond, while the dominant areas of operation of the groups still remain the North Eastern States of Borno, Bauchi and Yobe, with several other attacks reported in Plateau and Niger States, North Central Nigeria.

For maximum attention and impact the trend is for the sect to choose important national events or festivals to launch their deadly acts. In early November 2011 just two days to the Muslim festival of Eid-el-Kabir, it unleashed a devastating bombing spree on Potiskum and Damaturu in Yobe state, as well as Maiduguri in Borno State. It also targeted the 1st October 2011 Independence day celebration in Abuja, forcing the Federal Government to shift the independence day activities into the confines of State House. Since then, several bomb blasts have been recorded across the Northern parts of Nigeria with casualty figures well above 1,000.

The most significant, though not the least deadly were the blasts at the Police Headquarters of 16 June 2011 and the U.N. Head office, of 22 August 2011, both in Abuja, the seat of the Federal Government. Since then police stations have been vandalised at will and officers and men cut down with so much ease, including several officers of the State Security Service. In like manner, soldiers, especially members of the Joint Task Force, set up to tackle the menace are not spared. Even the precincts of army barracks have been hit by bombs while vulnerable banks have been attacked and millions of Naira taken to finance their various activities.

The most devastating of all the attacks came on Friday, January 20, 2012, a few hours after the Jumaat prayers (Friday Muslim prayers). On that fateful day, members of Boko Haram launched coordinated bomb and gun attacks in Kano, North Western Nigeria, targeting the State Security Service office, the Zonal and State headquarters of the police and several other police formations and the Immigration Office in the metropolis. The official casualty figure released by the police was 185, although reports by journalists and various aid groups put the figure at well above that. The sect will later claim that the Kano bombings were reprisals against the people and government of Kano State over the way and manner their members were been arrested and arbitrarily detained by the police. It will indeed be recalled that the sect had issued a warning that unless its members that were being detained by the police in various detention centres in the state were released forthwith, the city will not be spared. True to that threat, mayhem was unleashed on Kano, the magnitude of which had never been felt before.

Why then Boko Haram, if one may ask? According to the sect whose official name is Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad their aim is to completely Islamise Nigeria by having the Islamic Law firmly in place. The sect does not recognise the Nigerian constitution neither does it recognise the leadership of President Goodluck Jonathan. The man who identifies himself as the leader of the sect, Imam Abu Muhammad Abubakar Bin Muhammad Shekau had rebuffed any move at initiating dialogue with government. Iman Shekau who demanded that President Jonathan must first convert to Islam before any compromises scoffed at the recent hint by the President that government may be willing to dialogue with the sect. President Jonathan had in an interview with Reuters on Friday 27th January challenged the sect to come out publicly and declare what it wants from government, stating that his government may consider to dialogue with the group.

But the group remains adamant insisting that their demands be met first before any talks can be held. This clearly shows that the agenda of this sect goes beyond the merely religious connotation the issue had been given, knowing very well that it is impossible to implement their demand even in the North Eastern parts of Nigeria, not to talk of the entire country. What then is the motive behind these violent agitations?

President Jonathan had recently revealed at a church service to commemorate the 2012 Armed Forces Remembrance Day that members of the sect had infiltrated his government, the armed forces and the police. The president cannot be far from the truth judging by the inability of government to fight this group, which appeared to have better intelligence and more information about all decisions and actions of government. Recently, a high profile suspect that allegedly masterminded the Christmas day 2011 bombing of a church in Madalla, Niger State where about 50 persons were killed, Kabiru Sokoto escaped from police custody in a very mysterious manner while being conveyed to his house for a search by the police. So far, this development had claimed its highest casualty yet in the person of the former Inspector General of Police, Hafiz Ringim who was removed from office for this and for his general inability to deal with the violence.

According to the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, the whole problem is about poverty. In an interview he granted the Financial Times of London, Friday, 27th January 2012, he argued that ‘….There is a structural imbalance of enormous proportions. Those states {North Eastern Nigeria} simply do not have enough money to meet basic needs while some states {South South Nigeria} have too much….’ He cited the example of Federal allocation based on derivation from the oil revenue to Rivers State between 1999-2008 as being to the tune of N1,053 Billion as against the allocation to the States of Borno and Yobe which stood at only N385 Billion for the same period. Sanusi believes that it is now necessary to focus funds on regenerating other regions, if Nigeria wants to secure long-term stability.

While the Central Bank governor blames deprivation as the main cause of instability, others are of the opinion that the activities of the Boko Haram sect are clearly aimed at Balkanizing the country. Even the sect did not deny this when at the tail end of 2011 it issued an order for all Christians in Yobe state in particular to leave the state before a certain date. The threat to annihilate Christians was actually carried out as thousands of Christians had to flee the state for their life while their homes were razed down by the sect in a violent orgy of bloodletting. While Christians from other states of the country returned to their respective states abandoning their work and businesses, indigenous Christians from Yobe state have massively relocated to other areas of safety, leaving desolation in the wake of this ugly development.

In their various and varied reactions to the menace of this sect, the leaders of South South and South East Nigeria believe that the continued violence on the nation is a clear indication that the perpetrators are working with some unscrupulous politicians to scuttle the present political leadership in the country. They cannot be far from the truth. Throughout the period of the recent fuel subsidy removal protests in the country, the sect refrained from any violent activity; this complete lull in violence gave an insight into the hidden motive of the people behind the sect. However, when the Labour movement called off the protests after government had agreed to review downward the pump price of Premium Motor Spirit, the sect issued a threat on labour leaders for what it termed a betrayal of the people. The question then is since when had this group represented the general interest of the masses of Nigeria; some of the questions that needs answers.

Perhaps it is based on such trends that these leaders raised alarm, and rightly so, that Nigeria was being programmed for sinister considerations, and warned the armed forces not to contemplate any change of government as a result of the wanton destruction of life and property by an amorphous group. In the same vein, the Ijaw Youth {Jonathan’s kinsmen} in an open letter to the nation also alleged that some politicians who want to grab power at all cost are the ones sponsoring the Boko Haram sect.

While it is easy to empathize with President Jonathan that members of the dreaded sect have infiltrated his government, the truth however remains that this sect that started as a peoples’ movement around 2000 in the North Eastern part of the country has been hijacked by some politicians who want to remove Jonathan from office. For now, it is the culture of silence and complicity as no Northern politician is willing to come out openly and identify the sponsors of this sect or to talk evil of their activities all in the name of fear. Indeed, the Northern Governors have been accused of paying various sums of money to the sect to elicit their cooperation in one form or the other, a claim that had been vehemently denied, although there appears to be more than meets the eye in the entire Boko Haram conundrum. For now, while the violence continues, it is more an issue of politics rather than religion, although the religious angle is being dangled vociferously to elicit the cooperation of the majority of the gullible people in the region. And, for now it seems to be working.

The term ‘evangelization’ is open to misinterpretation, suggesting for some that it is synonymous with colonial domination and amounts to a kind of religious ‘imperialism’ by Western Christian missionaries who held indigenous African spirituality in contempt and who imposed their beliefs and institutions without restraint. But it is this objection which Pope Benedict’s messages in Benin directly counters. The Catholic presence throughout Africa was never intended to merely add to the numbers of baptized adherents. Nominalism is not the goal of evangelization; rather, the objective is an interior conversion which transforms individuals, promotes collective morality, and inspires society to safeguard the welfare of its every member.

How is evangelization expressed? Simply stated, evangelization enables believers to witness of their commitment to ‘serve reconciliation, justice and peace.’ The Pope elaborates: Africa’s faithful Christians are not in competition or at enmity with those who profess other religious affiliation or whose preference is to exclude ties with any formal religion. By contrast, Africa’s Christians are meant ‘to become joyful instruments of divine mercy;’ sensitive and receptive to the needs and dignity of fellow Africans, without exception and without condition. Moreover, it is the duty of each Christian to be a contributor ‘to the common good.’ And, that common good must be recognized as possessing ‘its own spiritual and material’ patrimony. Nor is it ever to be identified with exclusive Christian interests. The challenge facing the Catholic Christian is that of cooperating to actualize the potential of all Africans, so that Africa’s unique legacy of accumulated wisdom, of reverence for the environment, and of perseverance amidst adversity, may enrich across the globe.

From Pope Benedict’s discourse while in Benin, we may deduce several further characteristics of the Christian’s vocation as ‘servant of the common good’. Such servanthood:

(a) attests ‘to the possibility of a harmonious coexistence within the nation, and between Church and State.’ In this endeavor, ‘good will and mutual respect (…) are essential for building unity between individuals, ethnic groups and peoples.’ This is not Utopian idealism, but practically, through sincere effort, may come to fruition. (Address at Departure Ceremony, Gantin Airport, Cotonou)

(b) promotes realistic and profound hope. There is no doubt that ‘difficulties (…) are met along (life’s) way and which can at times be serious.’ But instead of leading ‘to discouragement, (they) become incentives to the awakening (…) of a deep spiritual life;’ one which eagerly seeks to foster ‘advancement in the search for spiritual and human development.’ The prospect to better the common good inspires inter-personal confidence and national optimism. (Address to Benin’s bishops, Apostolic Nunciature)

(c) translates piety into social action. Speaking to a meeting with children who greeted him at the Parish Church of Saint Rita, in Cotonou, Pope Benedict urged them to grow in the habit of prayer. But that prayer is not oriented to a privatized sanctification. On the contrary, prayer disposes the believer to engage in radical ‘forgiveness and charity’ towards all.

(d) ‘adopts a courageous ethical approach to (one’s) responsibilities.’ These words, from the Pope’s Address to government officials and to the diplomatic corps assembled at the Presidential Palace, appeal for transparency on every level of civic administration. The Pope recognized that scandals and corruption are prevalent. But he also stressed that these should not be ignored or condoned. Manipulation, greed, violence and intolerance are never acceptable choices. To serve the common good means that these be offset, notably by the facilitation of dialogue. For ‘dialogue is another way of loving God and our neighbor out of love for the truth.’

(e) Exercises prudence ‘in the delicate transition currently underway (in Benin) from tradition to modernity.’ Benin cannot set aside its ‘ancient and noble traditions.’ But the nation must not be so fixated upon that heritage that it risks those pitfalls which afflict the African continent (e.g. an unbridled ‘law of the market,’ excessive nationalism, ‘exaggerated tribalism’). ‘The transition to modernity must be guided by sure criteria based on (such) virtues (as) are listed in (Benin’s) national motto.’ Those who serve the common good desire ‘to give (their) best to everyone.’ (Address for Welcome Ceremony, Gantin Airport, Cotonou)

The move by the ANC is essentially pre-emptive, and puts them on a par with some of the more anti-democratic nations which routinely restrict the press. To the credit of the media in South Africa, and in fact of opposition parties, they have not only continually expressed their opposition to the bill and its forerunner which planned for a stifling Media Tribunal, but they have been continually and fearlessly uncovering corruption in the government, from underhanded tenders for work to corruption over arms deals at the highest levels.

South Africans stood up for themselves and were not cowed by the passing of the undemocratic bill, however. The ‘Black Tuesday’ protests, organised by media and civil society organisations and echoing 1977′s Black Wednesday when the Apartheid government banned a number of media organisations, struck a chord, with South Africans at home and abroad wearing black and even blacking out their online profile pictures. Desmond Tutu and even Nelson Mandela, in a rare criticism of ANC policy, publicly denounced the bill. Bravely, investigative journalists have also done the right thing by vowing to fight on and keep telling people the truth. As has been pointed out by veteran journalists, it is possible that the ANC is trying to intimidate people who may know certain things they don’t want to become public. With increasing information sharing, and contact between journalists and sources, it is possible that somewhere somebody knows something the party wants kept secret. Of course, while journalists and editors will continue to work for freedom, the bill is aimed at – and will doubtless deter – those sources who would be able to provide the information. Their actions in sharing information nebulously classified by politicians as being hidden due to ‘public interest’ will be criminalised.

The perhaps not too well-kept secret that is now out of the bag, however, is that the ANC could justifiably be charged with harbouring undemocratic tendencies. Already suffering something of a turbulent patch in their international reputation, their spokesperson Jackson Mthembu is going to be working overtime for the next while to try and come up with a convincing message for a sceptical audience. Not only has the party been in the headlines abroad – as well as at home – for corrupt arms deals, crooked politicians and security officials, and Julius Malema’s various turns at racism and buffoonery, but tough questions have been asked about the party over its stance on Libya and relationship with Muammar al-Gaddafi, its perceived deference to China over the Dalai Lama’s visa, and now most recently its abstention from voting at the UN Security Council over the crackdown in Syria.

There is no denying that these are all serious and complicated issues, and taking a particular side on any of them is not an open and shut matter. There are also clearly pressing geopolitical realities following a series of international conflicts, and a fairly dangerous and unstable world economic situation – and equally dangerously an increasing ‘with us or against us’ mentality in Europe, the U.S., the Middle East and elsewhere. The tightening up of security given these realities is perhaps understandable for the ANC, but the curtailing of democratic freedoms is not going to help their reputation at all – proof of which can be seen in the aforementioned international media coverage of their ‘Secrecy Bill’.

Thus, the ANC has played their hand. While it is foreseeable that in the short-term, sources may be discouraged from sharing information which government figures deem classified, it is likely that the ANC has done more damage to its reputation with its own actions anyway. They have also provided an object lesson and a warning to other governments with democratic aspirations, which is that in today’s age, it’s not easy to control and contain information – but if you don’t learn to manage it properly, it could end up controlling you.

According to a widely reported idea, Jacob Zuma may have acted just in time to save himself from being challenged by Malema at the ANC’s upcoming meeting and hundredth birthday at Mangaung, due to take place in January. While this is a matter of debate, as in the ANC’s hierarchical arrangement Malema would not technically have had the authority to do so, given Malema’s outspoken reputation such a performance would not have come as a surprise. As things stand, the ANC, and Zuma by his actions, have been praised for removing a bugbear to many, including the party itself. Whites were put off by Malema’s purported exploitation of racial tensions, business and markets by his calls for nationalisation, and the international community and South Africa’s allies for his lambasting of their journalists (the BBC’s Jonah Fisher) and denigrating of their allies (Botswana). With political anger rising, and tangible economic problems such as a downgrading of the country’s credit rating over fears of instability in its key industries, the presidency has acted prudently if a little late in dealing categorically with Malema’s ill-discipline.

However, Zuma may still find himself chewing bitterly on his own earlier words. In 2009, the South African president praised Malema as a potential ‘future leader’ of the ANC and the country. While it remains to be seen whether Malema can stage a comeback, there is a lot of foresight in media reports that the rise of Malema is a symptom reflecting deeper realities in South African politics. South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world, a statement for which countless statistics can be found on the internet and elsewhere – to cite one example, its Gini coefficient of around 65 places the country is in the top five most unequal societies in the world – sadly, along with its close neighbours Botswana (63) and Namibia (70). For all its historically real and currently apparent sympathy with the poor, the ANC has not been able to narrow this gap since coming to power. Simply put, Malema managed to tap into the frustrations of the poor and give them something to believe in. That he was undone by his own confused mix of personal wealth, corruption, and miscalculated offence does not make the problem go away.

South Africa’s current leading politicians have a history of struggle behind them, and see themselves as the guardians of the liberation struggle in the country’s young democracy. Yet, these selfsame politicians have been decried for creating a corrupt system criticised for its cronyism, in a political alliance which, combining communists, black nationalists and free market thinkers, amongst others, has tried to be all things to all people – as long as they pledged their support to the ANC – and yet has not managed to liberate the approximately 50% of the population living in poverty. That this poverty affects black South Africans to a disproportional extent, and is to a large extent still affected by the system of Apartheid, is certainly true – but as a repeated statement of fact this holds little comfort for the starving.

What is striking about this system is that it seems to have become all-consuming – the same old politicians struggle for power at the top, with alliances shifting and backs scratched one day only to be stabbed the next. Young leaders such as Malema find themselves part of this monolithic ANC system, and all too often become tainted by the kind of corruption facilitated by power. Given the on-going power and leadership struggles, distorting the channels of communication for those citizens looking to the party for leadership, those who have a message for the disaffected which strikes a chord will find themselves listened to. In the most recent incarnation, this has meant embracing a populism which is dangerous not only for its content, but for its hollowness.

For Malema is not the first to reach out to the poor of the country by preaching populism. His own mentor President Zuma, now trying to clean his hands of the whole affair, came to power in 2009 to a large extent by reaching out to the poor, and claiming that he would fight poverty and inequality. Malema took up the poisoned chalice, and took the populism to the next step by calling for nationalisation and decrying imperialism. Zuma was either subsumed into the economic realities of the country and the markets, or cynically and not without guile accepted the fruits of the votes of the poor, but left behind the populism for pragmatism. Malema ostensibly stayed on message, at the same time exposing the dualities in the ANC not only to many South Africans to whom it was obvious that the country’s leadership was made up of strange bedfellows, but arguably even to many across the world who now see that the long-ruling party and indeed the country itself is riven by disagreement.

It has been said that one of the goals of politics is to ‘give voice to the voiceless’. Leaders and ex-leaders in the country’s leadership structure have capitalised on this fact, but the voiceless are still there, passed over in silence for now while ‘business as usual’ continues. Malema’s voice may have lacked the critical wisdom needed to guide the country, but until all South Africans are able to lift themselves up and experience equality, they will be listening for signs of hope. At a time when the country feels let down by its leaders, people may just feel that they need another hero.

Essex’s erroneous research spawned the theory that HIV originated in African monkeys. This misconception is critical because the concept is a pillar for the fallacy that HIV/AIDS is endemic in Africa.

In 1985, it was Essex and his team of investigators that “discovered” an “AIDS-like” virus in the blood sample of wild-caught African green monkeys (AGM). This “AIDS-like” virus eventually came to be called SIV, the Simian Immunodeficiency Virus; even though it did not cause immunodeficiency in African green monkeys.

AIDS was a hot topic at that time; the discovery of SIV by the Essex team was instant front-page news worldwide. Both scientists and the public were striving to make sense of this terrifying mystery, and the impact of this initial media acclaim continues to reverberate throughout the medical and mainstream media today, as well as adversely affecting HIV/AIDS and general health care interventions in Africa.

Yet, in 1988 – only 3 years later – the truth came out! SIV was not from Africa! SIV was not a new virus! Rather, what was thought to be SIV was actually another virus, which had contaminated the blood samples of the African Green monkeys.

This contaminating virus originally came from Rhesus macaque monkeys. As a species, Rhesus macaques originated in Asia, but these particular Rhesus macaques were residents of the United States, and lived at the New England Regional Primate Research Center (NEPRC) in Southborough, Massachusetts, where various species of primates were housed and bred for the purpose of medical experimentation.

Several months prior to the discovery of “SIV,” a researcher at NEPRC, Phyllis Kanki, had isolated the virus from 4 sick Rhesus macaques monkeys. She then gave Max Essex a sample. Three years later, another group of investigators compared the genetic structures of SIV (“discovered” by Essex) and the virus from Rhesus macaques. Genetically, the two viruses were 99% identical; meaning they were the same virus. The viruses Kanki had given Essex had contaminated the blood samples of the wild-caught AGMs in the team Essex laboratory (the blood samples but not the monkeys were brought over from Africa).

In 1988, Nature, the leading interdisciplinary scientific journal, published a letter by Essex admitting this contamination and its source. Nature also published the genetic analysis that exposed the contamination. However, both the admission and the genetic analysis seemed to pass unnoticed by the medical and scientific community at large – even though Nature followed up several months later with a short editorial entitled “Human AIDS Virus Not From Monkeys”.

Nonetheless, 6 months after Essex’s letter of admission was published in Nature, Scientific American – a magazine of far greater distribution – published an article co-written by Essex and Kanki entitled “The Origins Of The AIDS Virus” which featured a full-page, color photo of the African green monkey.

Thus, the theory that HIV originated in Africa primates perpetuated. This theory changed over time as the species identified as the source of HIV’s progenitor shifted from AGMs to sooty mangabeys to the common chimpanzee, the chimpanzee currently bearing the crown stamped “Origin of AIDS.” To date, dozens of SIVs have been isolated from at least 30 species of African primates, none of them causing immunodeficiency; nevertheless, they all are labeled “closely related” to HIV by the investigators who discovered them.

This categorical use of the misnomer “immunodeficiency” in this crop of viruses reflects the “plight” of virologists. To get funding, it’s best to be working on a primate immunodeficiency virus. The situation is analogous to the height of the ‘War on Cancer’ in the 1970s. At that time, any virologists working on viruses labeled oncogenic (causing or inducing tumor formation) were viewed in particularly favorable light by funding agencies.

In relation to the current situation with HIV/AIDS, this prerogative continues to afflict HIV/AIDS research funding and interventions across many scientific, medical, and allied professional domains.

Given all the known retroviruses “closely related” to HIV derived from primates in Africa, it is ironic that only 2 primate retroviruses are known to induce an analogous immunodeficiency in their original hosts; and both these retroviruses and their hosts come from the United States. The first is SIVmac, the aforementioned virus isolated from Rhesus macaques by Phyllis Kanki. The second is HIV. HIV infects the primates called humans.

Phyllis Kanki originally isolated SIVmac from 4 Rhesus macaque monkeys which had an immunodeficiency syndrome with a “remarkable similarity” to human AIDS. As with human AIDS, the immunodeficiency experienced by these Rhesus macaques was characterized by opportunistic infections; namely, candidiasis, cytomegalovirus infection, and cryptosporidiosis — all diseases characteristic of human AIDS as well. The appearance of these diseases in humans and Rhesus macaques means that their respective viral infections both damage the defenses of cellular immunity. Cellular immunity defends the body against fungi, virus, and parasites, specific types of infections that flourish during HIV infection. The bacterial defense mechanism, humoral immunity, remains intact during early HIV infection.

Kanki’s discovery of SIVmac and “simian AIDS” raised no great acclaim. She soberly suggested that SIVmac and Rhesus macaque monkeys might be suitable models for experimentation and drug development; an appropriate suggestion, but it was not until after the same virus was “discovered” in African green monkeys that it received any fanfare.

An exuberant reader might theorize, given the geographic juxtaposition of SIVmac and HIV, that SIVmac and Rhesus macaques represent the origin of HIV and AIDS. However, SIVmac shares only about 50% genetic homology (‘relationship’) with HIV, and collectively, all the African primate retroviruses share about 50% genetic homology with HIV.

SIVmac shares about 75% genetic homology with all the African primate retroviruses. So, genetically, SIVmac is more closely related to the set of harmless Africa primate viruses than to HIV. What makes sense is that SIVmac is actually a virus of African origin brought over generations ago by captured African primates, and the Rhesus macaque monkeys were exposed to this African virus by living in close proximity to these African species within the cages of the U.S. research facility.

In truth, HIV stands alone among the primate viruses. All the other primate retroviruses are clustered together; having approximately 75% homology. HIV stands off to the side with 50% homology. However, HIV shares 40% – 50% homology with a set of well-characterized, pathogenic (disease-causing) retroviruses; namely retroviruses that infect ungulates (animals with hooves): horses, goats, sheep, and cattle.

Before HIV and the African primate fiasco, most known retroviruses were infectious agents that caused disease in the aforementioned animals of economic interest. At the advent of HIV, virologists working with these animal viruses attempted to draw parallels between these pathogenic animal retroviruses HIV. This comparison was easy to make because some of these animal viruses and HIV shared biological infectious processes, such as the induction of syncytia (a massive cell created by the fusion of many cells) and neurotropism (the ability to infect brain cells). (Retroviruses are also found in birds, mice, rats, pigs, and felines – both house cats and lions. Since the advent of HIV, many retroviruses under study have been renamed “immunodeficiency” viruses.)

But the theory that HIV and AIDS originated somewhere “way over there” was more palatable than any research that might associate HIV and AIDS with food and ranch animals. Which, in part, brings us to our current status of misconception.

Chris Jennings

HIV/AIDS Analyst

Publications:

• The HIV/AIDS Biological Primer

• HIV/AIDS – The Jennings Report: Redefining the Size, Scope, and Scale of the AIDS Epidemic by Forensic Review of the Medical Literature

• HIV/AIDS Statistics in the Republic of South Africa (RSA): An Analysis of HIV/AIDS Mortality comparing Death Counts, Surveillance Data, and Modeled Estimates

For More Information: www.healthalert.net

The report published today titled, ‘You’ll Be Fired If You Refuse’: Labor Abuses in Zambia’s Chinese State-owned Copper Mines,’ details the persistent abuses in Chinese-run mines, including poor health and safety conditions, regular 12-hour and even 18-hour shifts involving arduous labor, and anti-union activities, all in violation of the country’s national laws or international labour standards. The four Chinese-run copper mining companies in Zambia are subsidiaries of China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Corporation, a state-owned enterprise under the authority of China’s highest executive body. Copper mining is the lifeblood of the Zambian economy, contributing nearly 75 percent of the country’s exports and two-thirds of the central government revenue.

‘China’s significant investment in Zambia’s copper mining industry can benefit both Chinese and Zambians,’ said Daniel Bekele, Africa director at HRW. ‘But the miners in Chinese-run companies have been subject to abusive health, safety, and labour conditions and longtime government indifference.’

The report is based on research conducted during three field missions in November 2010 and July 2011 and draws on more than 170 interviews, including with 95 mine workers from the country’s four Chinese copper operations and 48 mine workers from other multinational copper mining operations. Miners at Chinese-run firms said they were pleased that the companies had made a substantial investment in the copper mines and created jobs. But they described abusive employment conditions that violate national and international standards and fall short of practices among other multinational copper mining companies in the country.

‘Sometimes when you find yourself in a dangerous position, they tell you to go ahead with the work,’ an underground miner at Non-Ferrous China Africa (NFCA) told HRW. ‘They just consider production, not safety. If someone dies, he can be replaced tomorrow. And if you report the problem, you’ll lose your job.’

Between 5th – 12th October, 2011 miners at three of the four Chinese-run copper mining operations initiated strikes, hopeful that the new government’s election would create an environment for improved conditions. Production ground to a halt. On October 19, NFCA, the longest-operating Chinese-owned copper mine, fired at least 1,000 striking workers. After government pressure in subsequent days, NFCA agreed to reinstate them. Reuters reported that NFCA’s chief executive officer said that the reinstated workers would be screened and the ‘troublemakers’ disciplined.

Miners from the Chinese-owned companies described consistently poor health and safety standards, including inadequate ventilation that can lead to serious lung diseases, the failure to replace workers’ damaged protective equipment, and routine threats to fire workers who refuse to work in unsafe places underground. These practices, combined with the already dangerous nature of copper mining, cause injuries and other health complications. At times, Chinese managers bribe or threaten miners to keep them from reporting accidents or other problems to the government’s Mines Safety Department, the miners said.

‘Many of the poor health and safety practices we found in Zambia’s Chinese-run mines look strikingly similar to abuses we see in China,’ Bekele said. ‘Respecting labour laws and ensuring workers’ safety should be standard operating practice both in China and abroad, not treated as an irritating barrier to greater profits.’

In addition to their poor safety standards, several Chinese-run copper operations in Zambia require miners to work brutally long shifts, despite difficult conditions involving extreme heat and contact with acids and noxious chemicals. Many miners at Sino Metals work five 12-hour shifts a week as well as a sixth 18-hour ‘change shift’ when they rotate from the day shift to the night shift or vice versa. Other miners there described working 365 days without a single day off. Zambian law specifies a 48-hour work week, and every other multinational copper mining company uses 8-hour shifts that comply with this law. Several miners said the long hours contributed to accidents, and many complained about failing to receive proper overtime.

The curtailment of union activity hampers the ability to address these and other issues of concern to workers – particularly pay, which is higher than the country’s monthly minimum wage, but much lower than that paid by other multinational copper mining firms. Several Chinese-run operations have prevented workers from exercising their right to join the labour union of their choice through threats and intimidation. Miners in companies run by the Chinese or other multinationals also described retaliation against outspoken union representatives, including docked pay or refusal to renew their contracts.

China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Corporation (CNMC) responded in detail to HRW’s findings and also said they have launched a general investigation into the issues across CNMC-owned operations, with the aim to rectify existing malpractices, to eliminate possible potential risks, and to work together in managing their enterprises well.

On health and safety, the Chinese say the management approach that CNMC-owned operations have adopted places high importance on issues related to health and safety conditions during production and are in accordance with the requirements of the country’s mining laws.

On the issue of union activity, broadly speaking, the Chinese say they value collaboration with the trade unions and have never interfered with the right of any employee to join a union. There are, they say, currently branches of two trade unions within NFCA for instance. They claim there was only one union in CNMC-owned operations prior to 2006.

CNMC they say, is a Chinese state-owned enterprise under the direct supervision and management of the State Council, thus it is essential to their long-term vision to fulfill their social responsibilities and to bring benefit to the locals.

In its report, HRW said while there have been improvements on many labour issues since the Chinese companies first started operations in 2003, they still fail to meet the standards of both labour law and their multinational competitors in the country’s copper industry. Miners now periodically receive personal protective equipment, which previously was not provided systematically or in its entirety. But the equipment is still generally not replaced when damaged during work, leading to unnecessary accidents and health problems. After years of pressure from the unions and government, first aid kits and ambulances have been added to respond to serious injuries – though workers said first aid kits taken underground are often incomplete because managers are careless about safety.

‘Recent improvements show that Chinese companies will abide by labour laws when the Zambian government fulfills its responsibility to protect workers’ rights,’ Bekele said. ‘But while Zambia’s mining laws are strong on paper, the government has failed to enforce them.’

Primary responsibility for ensuring that the country’s copper mining companies operate in accordance with national and international standards rests with the government. It has a Mines Safety Department within the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Development that is responsible for enforcing the country’s mining regulations, including on health and safety.

However, the department is understaffed, underfunded, and accused by miners of being corrupt – leaving it almost wholly ineffective. It performs virtually no proactive inspections and because of budget constraints, at times requires companies that are to be investigated to pay for transportation and other costs. The fines it is allowed to impose are so low that they have almost no deterrent effect, HRW said.

The Labour Ministry has routinely endorsed collective bargaining agreements containing provisions that conflict with Zambian and international labour law. It has also failed to take action against companies that commit prejudicial acts against union representatives.

‘Rather than simply blame Chinese-run firms, President Sata needs to ensure that his government is effectively protecting workers’ rights,’ Bekele said. ‘More stringent measures are needed against all companies that flout labour laws and mining regulations.’

Now, nearly three years later, the media has focussed largely on the activities of the International Criminal Court, on the machinations the men on trial at the Hague for Murder, incitement to murder and hate broadcasting. Last month Pre-Trial Chamber II found reasonable grounds to believe that William Ruto, together with Kiprono Kosgey, are criminally responsible indirect co-perpetrators for the crimes against humanity of murder, forcible transfer of population and persecution. The prosecution has argued that Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Jomo, and once darling of the West, met with leaders of the outlawed Kikuyu-based Mungiki sect in order to organise retaliatory attacks in the Rift Valley towns of Nakuru and Naivasha, in response to the initial attacks on the Kikuyu community in the region.

In Kenya, a few academic articles look at the role of hate crimes and hate broadcasting, drawing parallels with Rwanda. The media here asks whether or not the violence was orchestrated, masterminded and funded, and by whom, and for how long. Much of this coverage misses the central point that Kenyans are concerned with. How will Kenyans process this information? Where does the responsibility lie to make sure it never happens again? Can civil society groups, elders, the media, commentators and educators supply the necessary emotional and intellectual parameters and wisdom to guide this discussion to a positive outcome?

In Ivory Coast last year, incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo’s rejection of the victory of his political challenger, Alassane Ouattara, led to a four-month standoff that brought the country to the brink of renewed civil war. Hundreds of thousands were displaced, and thousands were killed. Last spring in Nigeria, following news that incumbent president and southern Christian Goodluck Jonathan had won the presidential contest, anger in northern states originally directed at the ruling People’s Democratic Party mutated into religious and ethnic violence that left an estimated one thousand people dead.

Yet, for Americans, elections are a good thing. They define democracy. In school, American children learn about the gradual expansion of suffrage to almost all citizens. Americans also think that elections are decisive, which means that, at least in theory, if a candidate wins office by one vote, he or she wins. But there is a deeply ingrained respect for the rights of losers—and a recognition that they might be the winner next time. Americans are not keen on power sharing, even if a poll is close. Instead, the losers wait for the next election and try again.

This willingness to relinquish power and wait patiently for the next election is rooted in shared American values and well-developed civic identities (in spite of current divisions in Congress). Further, there is the expectation that elections in the United States will happen—no matter what. It is well known that during World War II, Americans did not postpone elections, and there were elaborate arrangements to allow those serving in the armed forces to vote. Accordingly, Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected to a fourth presidential term, defeating New York governor Thomas E. Dewey. But few probably remember that presidential elections were also held on schedule in the United States during the Civil War, with Abraham Lincoln defeating General George B. McClellan. The contest was real: Lincoln thought he would lose.

Hence, it is no surprise that, in the postcolonial era, official U.S. policy in Africa has been to do what it can to promote free, fair, and credible elections. In Nigeria, for example, the United States has contributed millions of dollars toward elections since the restoration of civilian government, mostly in support of Nigerian and American nongovernmental organizations working to make elections meet international standards. In Ivory Coast, the Obama administration provided generous support to the United Nations as it organized the November 2010 elections.

However, unlike the United States, many African countries are profoundly divided, with longstanding grievances, weak institutions, and nascent, if any, national identity. This is compounded by the preponderance of “winner takes all” politics. When losing an election means losing access to patronage, competitors are willing to risk anything. They will mobilize divisions within society, whether ethnic, religious, or regional, to protect their access to state wealth and power. An abundance of unemployed and often uneducated youth is a particularly destabilizing force, easily manipulated by politicians seeking to intimidate or attack rivals.

Some observers have suggested that in the African context, the emphasis on elections is an example of Western cultural imperialism, of the West’s imposing its value system and political practices where they may not be appropriate. Critics will argue that for elections to work there must be a sense of national identity, the rule of law, a certain level of education, and sufficient economic development to allow voters to make a free choice and not feel beholden to their boss, patron, or ethnic leader. These prerequisites are incomplete in much of sub-Saharan Africa.

The trouble with this argument is that Africans themselves wholeheartedly embrace elections as a way to express their will. Indeed, in Ivory Coast the electoral turnout was unprecedented: at least 80 percent of registered voters cast their ballots. In Nigeria in 2007 and 2011, turnout was low—because of the widespread perspective that elections would not matter and a fear of violence. But, in the past, turnout has been high. In fact, given the opportunity, Africans are likely to vote with enthusiasm.

So, if Africans embrace elections, who are outsiders to say that they are inappropriate? The discussion of “Asian values” more than twenty years ago advanced the notion that despite countries’ economic progress, “cultural” barriers to democracy and elections existed in such places as Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. Yet look at where many of these countries are now: there is little question they are more democratic than during the height of the “Asian values” debate. They are not perfect democracies, but then neither is the United States, France, or the United Kingdom.

Further, alternative models of governance in sub-Saharan Africa are less attractive than admittedly defective democratic ones, particularly over the long term. The most common alternative has been military rule, where the military comes to power to “clean up” a “mess” made by civilians. But military rulers often hold on to power as long as they can and become progressively more oppressive. Hence, in Nigeria, the mild regimes of Yakubu Gowon and Murtala Muhammed were ultimately followed by the alleged kleptocracy of Ibrahim Babangida and the savage oppression of Sani Abacha. And, with one short civilian interregnum, the military kept power for a generation, all the while proclaiming that it was “restoring” democratic rule even as many of the colonels became rich.

And, despite the gloom of Ivory Coast and Nigeria, there are numerous examples of successful elections. Ghana is remarkably similar to Ivory Coast in its divisions, yet it has had a series of successful elections. Liberia was a victim of “big man” politics for years, yet the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in 2005 was seen by Liberians as credible, and the 2011 polls look promising. There is also South Africa, where every election since the end of apartheid in 1994 has been regarded by international observers and South Africans themselves as legitimate.

So, rather than succumbing to Afro-pessimism, what should Africa’s friends do to promote democracy and free, fair, and credible elections? Western democracies should continue to support African civic organizations that are working for credible elections, the rule of law, independent judiciaries, and democracy. These organizations often operate on a shoestring, limiting their capacity, but in some countries (Nigeria, for example) they have strong grassroots support. Western donors should provide political and material assistance to African judiciaries as well. For example, the international community should not hesitate to speak out about the intimidation of African judges or juries. On the practical and concrete side, when international donors supply word processors to a court, they assist in speeding up the judicial process—and the delivery of justice. This reinforces the rule of law.

When governments are involved in election rigging, the international community should disapprove publicly and withhold official expressions of congratulations to the victor. In the same vein, outside democratic governments should be leery of supporting “governments of national unity,” which enable “big men” who have lost credible elections to stay in power largely because they are willing to resort to violence. Governments of national unity in Zimbabwe and Kenya have done little to promote democracy or to resolve fundamental political issues. (They did reduce—though not eliminate—the violence in the short term.)

These steps are not dramatic, nor are they glamorous. For Americans, it may be uncomfortable to acknowledge that their ability to influence the growth of democracy and the rule of law in Africa is limited. It is Africans who will build both, in their own ways and with their own visions. Democracy was not built in a day in the United States. Likewise, it may take some time for Africans to develop the institutions necessary for smooth democratic transitions. But they will do it, and the United States should continue to assist in the small ways it can.

Authors: John Campbell is a Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies and Asch Harwood, Research Associate, both at the American think-tank, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

Markets and Democracy Briefs are published by CFR’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy initiative. They are designed to offer readers a concise snapshot of current thinking on critical issues surrounding democracy and economic development in the world today.

The despot’s defeat came swiftly, following his discovery in a sewage line in his home town of Sirte, one of the last strongholds of loyalist troops in the country. There he was captured and reported to have been fatally wounded in crossfire between his supporters and  interim government National Transition Council (NTC) fighters. His body was quickly revealed by the NTC to the world’s media, lest there be any doubt that the erstwhile dictator was dead- a measure necessary given false confirmation earlier in the year of the capture of his son Saif. For the Libyan people, Gaddafi’s body was put on public display in a supermarket refrigerator in the port city of Misrata, where scores lined up to view and photograph it.

Although celebrations across the country do not show any sign of waning just yet, Gaddafi’s end is not as neat a culmination as many would like. Libya’s chief pathologist, Dr Othman al-Zintani, reported that Gaddafi died from a gunshot wound to the head; however the turn of events marking his last moments is mired in confusion; he was reportedly captured alive, but injured in both legs. Transported to hospital he dies in crossfire; but camera phone footage reveals him covered in blood and jostled by handlers, dragged to the ground by his hair.

The uncertainty of how he met his end has lead to questions of culpability and whether Gaddafi in fact died at the hands of the mob. Following calls by US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and the UK Defence Secretary Philip Hammond, the United Nations has already said it would conduct an investigation into his killing. New York-based organisation Human Rights Watch, viewed the body, and confirmed video footage, photos and other information ‘indicate that [he] might have been executed after being detained’.

By and large, these concerns are not shared by the Libyan people.

Khalid al-Jibouni of the Tripoli Youth Union – a volunteer organisation promoting civil society – told the Guardian: ‘Now Gaddafi is dead, the pillars of the regime have all fallen. Until now, some people still thought that Gaddafi could somehow come back. Now we can really breathe freely.’

But Gaddafi’s removal is also of great significance to the international community. The leader’s ‘Islamic Legion’ committed heinous crimes in West Africa, including supporting and backing rebel leaders Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor in Sierra Leone and Liberia respectively.  Agents murdered political opponents abroad, and he was the proponent of terrorist activities including IRA violence and the Lockerbie bombing which killed over 250 people in 1988.

The involvement and backing of NATO forces certainly abetted the revolution- and will no doubt play an invaluable role in rebuilding the country- but it did lead to inevitable questions as to their future role in the country. As we foresaw back in August,  it will be a daunting task; but should the West decide to replicate a democratic etic in Libya it could give rise to further problems. Given all political opposition was outlawed under Gaddafi’s leadership, parties have a long road ahead of them before they come to plan for a new government and constitutional assembly; but they must be allowed to take these steps themselves.

The democratic tenet on which the revolution was based and Gaddafi ousted must not be forgotten and it is important that the country feels it can now act in an autonomous manner, without interference.

Prior to Gaddafi’s capture, former UK foreign secretary Sir Malcolm Rifkind told BBC Radio 4 Today programme;

‘This isn’t about the British position or the NATO position – it’s about what the Libyans themselves want and can live with.

‘It is their country and it is their future’: a precept which rings as true following Gaddafi’s removal – however it happened.

As much as the international community – and, it must be said, many Libyans too- had held out hope that Gaddafi would finally be made to answer for his atrocious crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC), pursuing the manner of his death is not what should take precedence in Libya now. Investigations into his killing will no doubt distract from the task of implementing change in a country decidedly on the cusp of securing democratic, people-led governance.

It is a particularly key moment for the NTC to look to the future. Just two days after Gaddafi’s death interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril confirmed that Libya’s new leaders have a ‘very limited opportunity’ to put their differences to one side, as he announced he was stepping down. Pro-Gaddafi fighters are still heavily armed and have yet to yield to the interim powers, so a resurgence of conflict is not yet out of the question.

The legality of the NTC has also been weakened by alternative explanations of Gaddafi’s killing, which differ from their official account. This undermines somewhat their democratic imperative, and combined with a protracted delay in disposing of his body has led some analysts to suggest political disorder is imminent.

Ed Husain, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations believes that ‘the chaotic manner in which Muammar al-Qaddafi was allegedly captured, injured, and then killed is emblematic of the mismanagement and blunders of the Libyan National Transition Council. Worse, the barbaric manner in which–at least according to several photographs–the killers surrounded his blood-soaked corpse does not bode well for the emergence of a democratic culture inside Libya soon.’

The danger is, if we dwell too much on Gaddafi’s death, we malign the thousands of Libyans’ who died or are missing in pursuit of democratic freedoms.

George Grant of the British-based think-tank The Henry Jackson Society believes that reconciliation with former Gaddafi security forces and civilian personnel who were not found guilty of serious crimes ‘must be an absolute priority’.

‘Their inclusion in any post-Gaddafi settlement will be vital not just because of their expertise, but also because of the importance of incorporating potentially antagonistic constituencies into the transitional framework, thus maximising its chances for success,’ he said.

Revolutions are not new to the Arab world – even Gaddafi styled himself as ‘Guide of the Revolution’ having led the coup d’état to overthrow King Idris I in 1969. But 2011’s Arab Spring has brought a new, stronger component; the voices of the people. Having shaken the shackles of an obdurate rule, Libyan’s are now in a position to decide for themselves what kind of political future they want and the country’s official liberation, announced on October 23, will no doubt draw a timeframe for elections to be held. Although it is not yet clear who or what will take the place of Gaddafi or the monarchy he overthrew, the forces of the revolution will surely propel Libya toward a healthier future. Rich oil reserves and the propensity for a lucrative tourist industry could provide a bounty of opportunity for a country of just 6 million people.

The company’s founder and Chief Executive, Aiden Heavey, had the idea, in the 1980s, of venturing into the oil and gas business when a friend of his mentioned there were oil fields in parts of Africa that had been more or less abandoned by the major oil companies. These majors had left because they were not satisfied with the outcome of the work they had done. But Heavey’s friend suggested he gave it a try to see if something good could come of it.

Another friend who worked at the World Bank fuelled Heavey’s ambitions further when the friend told him about a project in oil and gas in Senegal. So, off he went to Senegal and that’s how Tullow started.

Given his background in accountancy, Heavey had, at that point, very little knowledge of the oil and gas industry. So when he started Tullow Oil, he wasn’t given much of a chance to succeed. Nevertheless, he has worked hard at it for the past 25 years to bring Tullow up to this point.

In 2007, Tullow Oil plc did some analysis on oil prospects in Ghana. The data and information looked promising and so to Ghana Tullow headed. Its initial involvement in the country was in a couple of blocks in partnership with other oil companies.

Gayheart Mensah, Head of Investor Relations and Corporate Communications of Tullow Ghana Limited explains that ‘very often companies will go into partnership, particularly in countries that are not known to be oil and gas producing, for purposes of mitigating risk. To drill one well for instance can cost between $80 and $100 million. If you’re able to strike oil, then you are in good business, but if not, it’s about $100 million of investment down the drain. Nobody refunds that money to you.

‘And so when Tullow came into Ghana, it went into partnership with a number of companies: Kosmos Energy, Sabre Oil, Anadarko Petroleum, EO Group and, indeed, there was Ghana’s own National Petroleum Corporation. Altogether there were six companies. There were two oil blocks that Tullow had strong interest in, and the company worked these two blocks with the same partners.’

In 2007, oil was discovered straddling these two blocks. This field was named Jubilee because the discovery was made in the year Ghana celebrated her 50th independence anniversary. When it was established that it was in commercial quantities, the issue then became what would be the earliest time that Tullow and its partners can produce this field. It was clear that Ghana couldn’t wait for the financial benefits that would accrue, given that the country needed massive infrastructure development.

‘Normally, in the oil and gas industry, it takes 7-10 years from the point of discovery to be able to produce fields. But in this particular case, after several discussions and development models had been looked at, the partners pledged to develop and produce the field within 40 months.’

This was a very ambitious target. Indeed there was a lot of scepticism within the industry as to whether this target was attainable. But the partners were not to be daunted. ‘We worked diligently at it and we were able to produce oil within the stipulated time,’ Gayheart says.

‘It has been acclaimed as a world-class achievement, and has attracted a lot of reviews because of the accelerated nature of the project, and because we were able to deliver within 40 months, particularly in Ghana, which didn’t have any oil history,’ Gayheart explains. ‘We didn’t have any oil field development and production infrastructure. It has really been a remarkable achievement.

‘How were we able to do that? It had to do with the effectiveness of the partnerships on this project. When it was decided that the field had to be produced via an accelerated project, a number of quick decisions had to be taken. The reason why it takes quite some time to develop a field has to do with the need to understand the nature of the field; the geophysical conditions and how these play out; the quality and types of the sands and rocks, levels of porosity and permeability, and several other technical conditions.

‘All these feed into determining how to develop the field and extract the oil. It helps determine what would be the best option, in terms of the deployment of facilities for the purpose of developing and producing the field,’ Gayheart says.

But Tullow had very little understanding of the Jubilee Field. Notwithstanding that, the company went ahead with the information that it had. Equipment was ordered in advance. Such orders or equipment would depend on the nature of the field and have to be ordered according to certain specifications. Others lend themselves to off-the-shelf solutions. In placing the advance orders for the Jubilee Field, Tullow made allowance for any eventuality.

FPSO Kwame Nkrumah:

Soon, it became very clear to the technical team that the best option for developing the Jubilee Field was to deploy a Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessel, normally used for offshore production. They float on the sea and are hooked up to the various infrastructure laid on the ocean bed. For instance, with regard to the Jubilee Field, from the surface of the water to the ocean bed where the drilling actually starts is a distance of about 1.5km. That’s why it is referred to as a deepwater development.

Drilling, from the ocean bed, can go as deep as 3km to 4km under the sea – drilling through very hard rocks in order to get to the reservoir, where the crude is deposited. During production, the crude is extracted from the crust of the seabed and goes through many kilometres of production lines, until it gets into the FPSO. FPSO Kwame Nkrumah has a reservoir for storing crude, after it had gone through some initial processing, from where other vessels come for their supplies ready for sale to the international market.

FPSO Kwame Nkrumah cost about $1 billion and the entire cost of the Jubilee Project is about $3.4 billion. FPSO Kwame Nkrumah is about 330 metres long, about three football fields put together. It took two years to build in Singapore by MODEC, a general contractor specializing in engineering, procurement, construction and installation of floating production systems including FPSO vessels. It is the fastest ever conversion of a tanker vessel of that size into an FPSO.

The Jubilee Project made a number of pledges and delivered on them, which has drawn a lot of attention to the project. Among them are:

• FPSO delivered within two years

• Production of oil from the Jubilee Field within 40 months

• Beginning of oil lifting from the Jubilee Field to international markets in January

It was acknowledged as a world-class project for a variety of reasons. The drilling efficiency of the project is one. This refers to the amount of time taken to drill a well, and the resources expended.

‘In the Jubilee Field we were able to achieve a record in terms of drilling efficiency. That’s part of the reason why the project was acknowledged as a world-class project.’

At the height of the operations, when installations and other activities were taking place, particularly in the first quarter of 2010, there were about 20 vessels working off the coast of Ghana. ‘Installation of the subsea infrastructure on the ocean bed requires specialised vessels. Due to the depths the water, no human being goes down there to lay anything. Robots (Remotely Operated Vehicles), assisted by the specialised vessels, are responsible for laying the infrastructure – even the proper positioning of pipes, tightening of knots and valves, etc.

Ghana had been exploring for oil for over 100 years without success, and questions were raised as to why it was taking the country so long to strike oil. ‘Basically, this had to do with technology’ Gayheart explains. ‘Up until about 15 years ago, deepwater technology hadn’t advanced to the stage that it has gotten to today. This held back successful exploration activities in Ghana, since most of the prospects were offshore.

On December 15 last year, Ghana had a huge celebration to finally mark oil production in the country. At the moment, the Jubilee Field has been producing 85,000 barrels of oil a day (b/d). It is anticipated this will move up to 120,000 b/d by the end of the year, which is the plateau production, and FPSO Kwame Nkrumah has the capacity to process that volume.

In order to extend the plateau production of 120,000 b/d over a longer period, the Jubilee Partners are working other wells within the Jubilee Field area.

Share offer

Tullow Ghana Limited has pledged long-term commitment to developing Ghana’s oil and gas capability. ‘Tullow intends to be in Ghana for the long haul. We have huge investment in Ghana because we have confidence in the value and industry of the Ghanaian. Recently we floated shares on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE). We ended up raising equity of $72.3 million from Ghanaians. It was the largest ever equity to have been raised on the GSE. Our share offer more than doubled the value of the Exchange, and that was an exciting achievement. We now have about 10,000 ordinary Ghanaian shareholders, which manifests our commitment to Ghana’ Gayheart says.

Developing human capital

Tullow Ghana has also done well investing in human capital. It initially sent 14 Ghanaian graduates to UK universities on scholarships to undertake Masters Degrees in subjects specific to the oil industry. They returned last year to the government institutions that they worked for. ‘We are building local capability and ensuring that it stays within Ghana to help develop the oil and gas sector,’ notes Gayheart.

The Tullow Scholarship Scheme will become a fully-fledged programme that aims to support learning and development in the oil and gas sector. It will assist Ghanaians every year to undertake studies in oil and gas related courses at UK universities. Some of these subjects will include petroleum engineering, environmental health and safety; taxation; and finance and accounting. This year, 24 Ghanaians have been sponsored by Tullow on this scholarship on a pilot basis. It will officially take off next year.

‘In order to ensure transparency in the scholarship programme, we’ve enlisted the help of the British Council to administer it on our behalf’ says Gayheart. ‘We agreed the criteria. The Council handles the selection process because it has the experience and track record.

‘We are also investing in education in the country, providing science labs and educational facilities. We are building a technical school in the Central Region, and supporting the Polytechnic in Takoradi to deliver curriculum that will build the required middle-level technical manpower for the oil and gas industry’ Gayheart says. This is being done in conjunction with TTE Technical Training Group, which is one of the UK leading technical training providers, focusing on the delivery of apprenticeship programmes and technical training services to the Oil & Gas, Manufacturing, Engineering and Petrochemical industries. Tullow is also working with the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology to support manpower development for the industry.

Our CSR

Indeed, Tullow’s corporate social responsibility has four pillars: education, health, entrepreneurial development and environmental protection. The company is also assisting the government to set up a small and medium-scale enterprises (SME) centre that will help develop the private sector. Internally, Tullow has a local content development department that reaches out to local companies that want to be part of the oil and gas supply chain, helping to bring them up to scratch. ‘The oil and gas industry is a stickler for standards, and as much as we want to help as many Ghanaians to take part in this process, we won’t compromise on standards,’ explains Gayheart.

In the area of health, Tullow supports local communities by organising quarterly health checks in communities in which the company operates, in partnership with Ghana Health Service (GHS). The GHS provides the doctors and paramedics who screen people for various illnesses such as eye defects, diabetes, breast cancer, malaria etc. The company also pays for treatment.

Tullow is building a maternity ward in the Western Region. ‘The issue of maternal health care has been on our radar, and we intend to contribute to addressing it,’ says Gayheart. ‘For the future we plan to assist the emergency unit at the hospital in Takoradi.’

The environment

On the thorny issue of the environment, Tullow has done an Environmental Impact Assessment of its operations on the immediate communities. The company shared its findings with communities, NGOs, policy makers, traditional leaders, the media, local authorities, in order to develop an action plan to mitigate the impact. The company consistently engages the fishing communities to listen to, and help address their concerns. Managing fishing expeditions and how they interface with operations at the Jubilee Field requires regular dialogue to promote understanding and co-existence’. Gayheart says.

On the whole so far Tullow has managed to establish a successful deepwater operating company in Ghana through its operations in the Jubilee Field. ‘We are proud to have been able to establish such high tech oil and gas operation in Ghana, relying predominantly on local capability’ Gayheart says.

‘To build such levels of local capacity within two years, in addition to producing the Jubilee Field has never happened anywhere before. Ghana is being touted as the fastest growing economy in Africa on the back of oil receipts’ Gayheart says. Until the production of oil last year, Ghana relied on cocoa, gold, timber and to some extent tourism for its foreign exchange revenue. Oil has helped to diversify this to a very large extent. .

Tullow hopes to make the Ghanaian industry bigger and more economically viable than Nigeria’s embattled oil and gas sector. The company is currently exploring in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon and Sierra Leone, all in West Africa. The company expects that the West African region will be a very resourceful area in terms of oil and gas production, if good finds are made.

Given that Tullow says it is in Ghana for the long haul, how does the company view the sustainability of oil production in the country? Gayheart says the Jubilee Field is estimated to last for 25 years. ‘There are other discoveries that have been made and so the industry in Ghana has a lot more years beyond 25’ Gayheart says confidently. Indeed, there are six other discoveries that Tullow is working on. Some, hopefully, will come on stream within the next few years, especially the Enyenra Field, similar to the Jubilee Fields in terms of reserves and resources, and the quality of the crude.

Gayheart says Tullow will turn its attention to this project next year, which is already at an advanced stage.

So what qualities have suddenly projected Tullow into the big league? A look at Tullow in Ghana will inevitably list the following:

• Drilling efficiency as recorded during the Jubilee Project

• Tullow’s operatorship of the Jubilee Field which has attracted global acclaim

• Delivery of oil from the Jubilee Field within 40 months

• The local capability that has been built in Ghana from 2007 till date

• Tullow’s strong relationships with the communities and key stakeholders

• The company’s agenda of ‘creating shared prosperity’ as manifested by listing on the Ghana Stock Exchange

• The state-of-the-art technology deployed to develop and produce the Jubilee Field

• The building of a deepwater development company in Ghana within a remarkable short period

• Quality of the crude produced from the Jubilee Field

• The Jubilee Projects outstanding record in the area of Environment, Health and Safety

• The excellent partnership with Kosmos, Anadarko, GNPC etc

• World-class partnership, great teamwork

Although the industry says that partnerships can be problematic for oil development, Tullow has worked well with its partners. It has also refused to re-invent the wheel, buying equipment off the shelf; equipment that has been used already by other companies.

‘But most of all the partnership with, and support from the Ghanaian government has been exceptional’ Gayheart proclaims. ‘Without them we couldn’t have gotten this far. The support and understanding from the government has played a major role in what we’ve been able to do so far.’