The oil production in Ghana has created great expectations, however, like its fellow African oil nations, the country faces challenges related to poverty, environment and corruption. This means that good management and fair distribution of the oil revenue will be crucial in order to improve the country’s poverty statistics. Ghana, which is heavily dependent on foreign aid, could even gain middleincome status within a decade if the country develops its oil resources successfully. This would be a vital change for acountry where 53 per cent of the population lives on just 2 US dollars a day.

As both hope and scepticism is building up around Ghana’s new oil production, the nation is very different from what it was just ten years ago. Ghana has already proved it is capable of economic and political development through its history of progression. The first president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, had great visions for Ghana. Unfortunately, he failed in transforming Ghana to the paradise everyone dreamed of after the country’s liberation in 1957. Falling commodity prices, debt crisis, and nearly 20 years of coups, military dictatorship and economic mismanagement resulted in low growth. The country’s economic problems continued far into the 1980s, when radical economic reforms were implemented with support from the IMF and the World Bank, through the so-called Economic Recovery Programmes (ERP), from 1983. The reforms led to increased aid from several countries, and eventually to private foreign investment. In more than a decade, Ghana was considered one of the most successful examples of these structural adjustment policies. This policy gave Ghana a relatively high economic growth, and provided a foundation for further development.

Elections have also played a crucial role in the country’s economic development. During elections in 2008, the incumbent president lost. Only half a per cent separated him from the winner. In many African countries, this would be a recipe for disaster, but in Ghana, there was a peaceful transition to a new government. Since the reintroduction of democracy in 1992, Ghana has held five elections. The power has shifted peacefully between the two major parties three times.

What is the root of Ghana’s democratic success? First of all, Ghana has had democracy since Captain Rawlings seized power in a military coup in 1981 and introduced a multiparty system and elections in 1992. The key factor is that the constitution forbids political parties based on a single ethnic group or religion. The political debate cuts across religious, ethnic and geographical divisions. An active community of NGOs and a relatively free and independent press has also played crucial roles in Ghana’s democratic success. Could Ghana’s political strength be the key factor to a well-developed oil production and fair distribution of its revenue?

Ghana’s oil discovery in 2007 was the biggest in the world that year. The oil fields are expected to generate approximately US 1.2 billion annually in two decades. We are talking about substantial sums for Ghana, which currently has a gross domestic product (GDP) of 16 billion dollars. Part of the petroleum revenues will be allocated to a stabilization fund to support the budget if oil prices fall, and inheritance funds for use after the oil is ending. The latter is debated in civil society due to scepticism about the government’s ability to manage such a fund, and that poverty alleviation measures should be implemented now. Ghana’s oil revenues are likely to strengthen the country’s national budget, but it remains unsure whether the oil reserves are large enough for export. Ghana’s 1.2 billion barrels are modest compared to Nigeria’s proven reserves of 36 billion barrels. Ghana’s government has since the discovery of its oil resources in 2007 shown genuine desire and strong ambitionfor effective management of oil revenues so that it benefits the country’s population.

As revenue from gold and timber has contributed little to reduce poverty, the Government has placed great emphasis on doing the right thing this time. The vision is that the oil will contribute to improvement in infrastructure and competitiveness, which in time will create jobs and increase growth and help reduce the high external debt and reduce aid dependency. Ghana can learn lessons from other petroleum countries. in Africa where oil has become a curse, and thus avoid

suffering the same fate. The country is more fortunate than many of its neighbours due to increased awareness of the challenges related to this resource curse. Ghana has decided to mimic the Norwegian oil management model and has signed a contract with Norway, a small Nordic country that has managed to convert its oil revenue to sustainable economic growth and welfare.

It requires a good management framework and healthy state regulation for Ghana to succeed. It is also important to open the gates to international investment and participation from international oil companies that come with huge capital and well-developed technology. All government administrative activities, transactions, agreements, plans and results should also be made completely transparent to the public so that corruption can be minimized. Furthermore, it is also appropriate that Ghana uses parts of the income to develop other sustainable industries that will result in, among other things, higher employment rates. Ghana also has a more stable democracy at the start of oil production. The country has been politically sustainable for the past two decades and if it continues on its path of democracy and accountability, it is more likely that the oil production will succeed in providing stability for the country’s poor population. Ergo, if a nation fails to provide a sustainable political system, all of the world’s aid, oil, diamonds or other resources will not help to improve a country’s economic situation.

There are mixed feelings about the oil discovery among the Ghanaian people. Some are very optimistic and consider it as a gift to the population while others, those who have the inherent fear of whether wealth will breed more greed, call the oil “The devil’s gold”. Fortunately, it has been predicted that the modest size of the oil resources, though provides a massive contribution to the economy, will prevent the country from becoming entirely dependent on oil, something which can hopefully prevent greed and corruption. The EU seems to have faith in Ghana as an oil distributer and has expressed it is convinced that Ghana will continue towards the direction of economic and political development that will profit the country’s population. The organisation is also convinced that Ghana will develop into a hub for international investment. Nevertheless, it will be interesting to follow Ghana’s new oil production and its further developments. Will the country be able to keep up with its ambitions and become a role model for other African nations or will it too suffer “The Black Gold” curse?

Up until now, Gaddafi has maintained a strong grip on power, by terrorising and bullying the Libyan people. His authoritative grip on power was further secured by the setting up of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah in the 70’s, which meant that rather than the conventional military holding power, this was shared by a network of trusted followers, tribal leaders and imported foreign mercenaries. This system was a clever way of reducing the chance of a military coup ; in fact the army itself is a poorly trained and emaciated force and small in number, and Gaddafi has in the past used his own security apparatus to strike against them. However, during his rule he has been loathed and feared in equal measure, including by his peers within and without Libya, and many think that it is time for him to go.

Whilst Gaddafi has been rejected for the most part of his leadership by the international community, their response has by and large been inadequate given the scale of atrocities he has committed. His use of a law forbidding groups to have any political ideology opposing him has resulted in many of his own citizens being imprisoned, and even sentenced to death. Torture and disappearances have also been common, and freedom of speech forbidden. It is time for him to be held to account for this; for his support of militant groups such as the Irish Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the numerous terror plots and bombs that followed on from that, including the bombing of the Pan Am Jet over Lockerbie; also for his sponsoring of the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia and the instability that caused in the wider West African region.

Although the UN imposed sanctions on Gaddafi following Lockerbie, they were quick to think that he had changed, and removed the sanctions when the bomber was handed over, and Gaddafi admitted responsibility; at almost the same time also he agreed on stopping his weapons of mass destruction programme. The UN missed an opportunity there to push for real democracy, and other freedoms including that of the press. The international community allowed him to bring Libya in ‘out of the cold’ without insisting on the setting up of institutions that will really hold him to account.

It is time now for the international community to take clear, swift and decisive action to oust him and his regime. Now fighting for his survival, he is committing further atrocities against his own people, firing upon them, and flying in African mercenaries to help him maintain power. Whilst the UN debate the best course of action, more people will die in the bloodshed there. Hence the need for a ‘smart intervention’, which will be swift, precise and quick; nothing like Iraq or Afghanistan.

There are those who may argue that those in the West have no moral authority with which to act, having so quickly given him a second chance before, and having supported him financially by doing business with him and bringing legitimacy to his rule that help him continue his reign of terror. But this is no time to sit back. The UN has made some initial moves to opposing him – Gaddafi has been referred to the ICC – but they need to go further than stating that his actions have been unacceptable and imposing sanctions, which Gaddafi has shown he can live with, and in any case, is a medium to long term solution. They need to demand regime change now.

It is clear that Gaddafi and his supporters have committed crimes against humanity for which they can be held to account for at the International Criminal Court. The louder and firmer the UN’s actions, the more likely that those close to Gaddafi will join the long line of defectors and help bring about his downfall, perhaps, without direct military action by the UN or NATO or a coalition of the willing to free Libya. However, if this fails in the coming days to bring Gaddafi down, then as President Obama has said, all options are being considered, including we must hope, the use of smart intervention. This will send a message that even if it takes 40 years, no one can rule a country in the way Gaddafi has; inflicting terror on his own people and the international community without meeting their comeuppance. And the very least the Libyan people deserve, after all their years of suffering, is for their quest for democratic freedom to be supported.

Although this decade has been one of impressive growth for LDCs, to see this growth as satisfactory and ease into a state of complacency would be extremely dangerous. The international community and LDC governments still possess the mammoth task of increasing and sustaining growth. Collier states that LDCs have ‘diverge[d] from the rest of mankind’. This divergence is momentous, leaving a vast gap between LDCs and OECD countries. This study proposes numerous strategies that aim to encourage a much more rapid growth of LDCs which will in turn close the gap between themselves and developed nations.

One of the key issues Collier tackles is how LDCs can encourage and efficiently utilise foreign finance, moving away from the current dominant trend of declining aid from other countries. One of the ways in which this can be achieved according to Collier is by reassessing and redistributing the finance currently provided by donors. At the moment a significant proportion of aid is being given to middle-income countries that are experiencing a steady rate of growth. Collier argues that although these middle-income countries do experience poverty in some areas, they are perfectly able to assist this situation with home finance, leaving more aid for LDCs. Throughout his study, Collier seems to champion the idea of prioritising the needs of LDCs and shaping policies to perfectly fit their needs only. Although it is true that developing nations need to grow at super-speed in order to catch up with developed countries, to completely prioritise their needs over underprivileged and struggling people living in developed countries is questionable.

A reliance on foreign aid is of course only a supplement to the focal ideal of self-sufficient LDCs. And here comes in Collier’s vision of an ever-increasingly urbanised developing world. Collier seems to see places such as rural Africa as an out-of-date, romanticised notion that is stifling its move towards a ‘more practical urban-economic agenda’. He would rather Africa starts a process of urbanisation and break their way into global markets.  This shift towards global manufacturing will provide LDCs with a dependable option as African agriculture will start to be under threat due to climate change.

The issue of climate change is also something Collier touches on in the study. He notes that this issue has up till now been dominated by the north and China, whose focus is to reduce global emissions – something that is irrelevant to Africa. The future change in climate will see parts of Africa become inhabitable for crops and thus trigger a decline in agriculture. Therefore the need for adaptation in LDCs rather than mitigation is stressed. Collier notes that research into Genetic Modification needs to be carried out so that this technology can be utilised to produce crop variations in areas that will be experiencing a change in climate. However, in ‘96 Europe banned numerous LDCs (most notably those in Africa) from implementing Genetic Modification technology. From this it is clear to see that the needs of LDCs are not being accounted for, and in order for these countries to grow, current policies need to be transformed. Therefore the global focus of ‘thinking green’ needs to be adapted for LDCs as it is clear that for Africa to pick up the echo of a European agenda will be impractical and damaging.

The most exciting issue raised in Collier’s study is the one of natural resources in LDCs. LDCs are the last frontier of untapped natural resources, and these resources are a potential gold mine for places like Africa. Collier estimates the worth of these resources reaching up into the trillions, overshadowing all other sources of income. These resources need to be taken advantage of and this can only be done if more research is carried out into what lies underneath these lands. The study also suggests numerous ways in which the excavation of natural resources in LDCs can be regulated to avoid exploitation. For example Collier states that LDCs should use global institutions to their advantage. An example will be, requesting that the World Trade Organisation oversees contracts in order to allow for fair and beneficial outcomes for developing countries.

Overall, Catching Up: What LDCs can do, and how others can help is an intriguing study that puts forth many viable strategies that will, if put in place, help the Least Developing Countries sustain a level of growth that will see them at least start to catch up with the rest of the world’s economies. Although Collier’s reasoning to shape and bend all the rules to suit LDCs advantage seems quite imbalanced at times, it is true that the only way in which LDCs can start to minimise the extraordinary gap between themselves and developed countries is to take drastic steps. And that is exactly what Collier does here. In the words of its author, this is the little book with big ideas.

Paul Collier’s Catching Up: What LDCs can do, and how others can help was launched on Tuesday 8th February by Deputy Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Ransford Smith at Marlborough House, Pall Mall, London.

‘We need to harmonize our interventions,’ army captain Sami Kambiré from Burkina Faso told IRIN. ‘Without this network, what we have now are disparate strategies. We need to learn from one another what is working; what is not and why’.

A number of studies on HIV prevalence rates among sub-Saharan Africa’s armed forces have shown higher rates than in civilian populations, with the notable exception of Ethiopia’s forces.

The three-day conference that launched the regional HIV network of military forces in West and Central Africa ended Thurs 9^th July.

Simeon Ekanom, coordinator of Nigeria’s armed forces program for AIDS control, told IRIN the Nigerian government has recognized the heightened risk for HIV infection among soldiers. ‘We are more mobile, far from our families. Men look to relax. Women come to the camps.’

The head of one of Nigeria’s state committees on HIV/AIDS told reporters in Aug ‘08 that both rebels and armed forces were committing rape in the Niger Delta conflict zone.

Returning soldiers had an HIV infection rate twice as high as that of the general population, according to a recent study conducted by the Nigerian civil military alliance to combat HIV/AIDS. The average nationwide HIV prevalence rate in Nigeria was 3.1 percent in ‘08, according to UNAIDS.

In ‘99 the Nigeria-based Pan African committee of military medicine found Nigerian armed forces had double the possibility of contracting HIV within three years of joining the army.

But Nigeria’s armed forces representative Ekanom said the situation has improved, though data remains scarce for HIV infection rates in the military. ‘Behaviours are changing. We go into the camps and talk to soldiers one-on-one. In groups, they do not internalize the message and think they could never get infected.’

The United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution in 2000 identifying HIV infection in defence forces as a threat to international peace. In ‘01 a UN document raised the concern that ‘the UN itself may be an unwitting agent for the spread of the HIV virus around the world’ through its peacekeepers.