The move by the ANC is essentially pre-emptive, and puts them on a par with some of the more anti-democratic nations which routinely restrict the press. To the credit of the media in South Africa, and in fact of opposition parties, they have not only continually expressed their opposition to the bill and its forerunner which planned for a stifling Media Tribunal, but they have been continually and fearlessly uncovering corruption in the government, from underhanded tenders for work to corruption over arms deals at the highest levels.

South Africans stood up for themselves and were not cowed by the passing of the undemocratic bill, however. The ‘Black Tuesday’ protests, organised by media and civil society organisations and echoing 1977′s Black Wednesday when the Apartheid government banned a number of media organisations, struck a chord, with South Africans at home and abroad wearing black and even blacking out their online profile pictures. Desmond Tutu and even Nelson Mandela, in a rare criticism of ANC policy, publicly denounced the bill. Bravely, investigative journalists have also done the right thing by vowing to fight on and keep telling people the truth. As has been pointed out by veteran journalists, it is possible that the ANC is trying to intimidate people who may know certain things they don’t want to become public. With increasing information sharing, and contact between journalists and sources, it is possible that somewhere somebody knows something the party wants kept secret. Of course, while journalists and editors will continue to work for freedom, the bill is aimed at – and will doubtless deter – those sources who would be able to provide the information. Their actions in sharing information nebulously classified by politicians as being hidden due to ‘public interest’ will be criminalised.

The perhaps not too well-kept secret that is now out of the bag, however, is that the ANC could justifiably be charged with harbouring undemocratic tendencies. Already suffering something of a turbulent patch in their international reputation, their spokesperson Jackson Mthembu is going to be working overtime for the next while to try and come up with a convincing message for a sceptical audience. Not only has the party been in the headlines abroad – as well as at home – for corrupt arms deals, crooked politicians and security officials, and Julius Malema’s various turns at racism and buffoonery, but tough questions have been asked about the party over its stance on Libya and relationship with Muammar al-Gaddafi, its perceived deference to China over the Dalai Lama’s visa, and now most recently its abstention from voting at the UN Security Council over the crackdown in Syria.

There is no denying that these are all serious and complicated issues, and taking a particular side on any of them is not an open and shut matter. There are also clearly pressing geopolitical realities following a series of international conflicts, and a fairly dangerous and unstable world economic situation – and equally dangerously an increasing ‘with us or against us’ mentality in Europe, the U.S., the Middle East and elsewhere. The tightening up of security given these realities is perhaps understandable for the ANC, but the curtailing of democratic freedoms is not going to help their reputation at all – proof of which can be seen in the aforementioned international media coverage of their ‘Secrecy Bill’.

Thus, the ANC has played their hand. While it is foreseeable that in the short-term, sources may be discouraged from sharing information which government figures deem classified, it is likely that the ANC has done more damage to its reputation with its own actions anyway. They have also provided an object lesson and a warning to other governments with democratic aspirations, which is that in today’s age, it’s not easy to control and contain information – but if you don’t learn to manage it properly, it could end up controlling you.

This new quarterly economic forecast is well placed to offer insight on macroeconomic trends across 25 RGMs which have been selected based on the size of the economy and population, strategic importance for business and proven strong growth and future potential. Included among the 25 RGMs are four African economies, namely South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana and Egypt.

Michael Lalor, Leader of the Africa Business Center at Ernst & Young comments, ‘We are particularly delighted that African economies are being included on an equal footing with other RGMs. This reflects Africa’s sustainable growth story and the increasing attractiveness of the continent for foreign investors.’

Longer term projections also reveal that RGM nations have grown on average by 5.8% per year over the last decade, more than three times as fast as the advanced economies combined. This fast pace of expansion is set to continue with growth in RGMs outpacing the advanced economies by more than 3.5% per annum over the next decade.

However, this future growth is all on condition that nations are able to deal with inflationary pressures and have adequate infrastructure in place to secure long term growth.

But with Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda recently raising interest rates in order to curb inflation, it seems, where possible, African governments are taking steps in order to continue this upward trend.

The inclusion of South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana and Egypt in the RGMs reflects the measures many African countries have taken to open up their economies and improve trade. As we reported last week, a new joint report by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank (Doing Business in a More Transparent World 2012), recorded a significant improvement to the ‘ease of doing business’ on the continent, with many countries implementing – and, crucially, adhering to – policy and regulatory processes.

An additional factor which may support continuing growth is that the RGMs bounced back from the global recession, with their GDP rising on average by 7.3% in 2010 – back to the buoyant rates that preceded the financial crisis. Although the forecast predicts a future marginal decline, this is more likely to affect South Africa and Egypt as, according to Lalor, they are most closely integrated into the global economy so are most directly impacted by the slowdown in mature market. With average GDP growth just under 6% in 2012, both Ghana and Nigeria together with a number of other economies in sub-Saharan Africa continue to grow at rates in excess of 7%. With exports accounting for around 50% of GDP in the RGMs as a whole, compared with 13% in the US or 41% in the Eurozone, it seems African markets are positioned to be virtually indispensible to the global economy.

Rain Newton-Smith, Senior Economic Adviser to Ernst & Young’s Rapid Growth Markets Forecast comments, ‘The RGMs are becoming increasingly more important in terms of both their overall weight in the world economy and their global influence. While the advanced economies struggle with weak growth the RGMs are well-placed to weather the economic storm.’

While the chaotic Eurozone crisis will inevitably continue to weigh on growth in the RGMs in 2012, the report indicates western companies are pursuing growth in the RGMs as a result of weak home markets. Ernst & Young’s Africa Attractiveness Survey, also illustrated the increasingly important role that investors from BRIC markets like China, India and also South Africa are playing on the continent. RGMF expects countries such as China and India to be more modestly affected, partly reflecting the large size of their domestic markets and the beneficial effects of lower oil and commodity prices, meaning that their investment is likely to continue – a good sign as foreign direct investment inflows to all RGMs have risen from US$205b in 2000 to US$444b in 2010, and they now receive around 50% of global foreign direct investment inflows.

Lalor says that in the African context, particular attention will need to continue to be given to ongoing institutional and regulatory reform, economic diversification, and the development of financial markets, all of which would help sustain and accelerate growth and development.

www.ey.com/rapidgrowth

The country’s AIDS prevalence is widely considered to be of epidemic proportions. WHO/UNAIDS statistics suggest hundreds of thousands of deaths each year in the state alone, so it follows that substantial research funding is being pumped into drug development by corporations, governments and philanthropic bodies alike.

Health Alert‘s new report HIV/AIDS Statistics in South Africa, however may turn existing policy towards the treatment of the disease on its head. The report challenges the assumptions underlying global estimates for the prevalence and distribution of HIV; raising further questions as to the actual market size for products related to treating infection.

Estimates from UNAIDS abound that the Republic of South Africa had 360,000 HIV/AIDS deaths in 1997, new tabulated surveillance data indicates only 6,635 deaths were actually attributed to HIV/AIDS.

UNAIDS also estimated that the country had 2.9 million people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWH) in the same year. Even given the 11-year survival period a substantial cluster of those individuals should have died by 2008;  however the county  tabulated a total of 136,000 HIV/AIDS deaths for the 11 years 1997-2008 inclusive, a figure far less than estimates would lead us to expect.

Report author Chris Jennings said ‘One problem is that epidemiological models incorporate a misconception about the HIV incubation period.

‘At the outset of the AIDS epidemic, the Centers for Disease Control actively tracked and interviewed patients, and determined that HIV incubation averaged 8- 18 months. Fifty percent (50%) of these patients died within 12 months of manifesting opportunistic infection. Therefore the first AIDS deaths occur 20 months after infection, not 10 years as currently conceived; changing the distribution curve’.

The surveillance data has been inputted into Computer models using specific algorithm’s to generate the results.

Health Alert report that pharmaceutical companies invest $300 million into developing anti-retroviral drugs thanks to an over-estimated market, but the most threatening diseases to mortality in the third-world; pneumonia, diarrhoea and tuberculosis, receive only marginal funding by comparison.

The organisation is not alone in its claim that the disease has been lent a disproportionate weight in terms of global policy and attention.

In establishing its own off-shoot agency UNAIDS, the UN has treated HIV ‘like an economic sector rather than a disease’, Roger England, chair of small Grenada-based think tank Health Systems Workshop, commented.

Health Alert challenges the common statistics oft cited by the UN with regards the epidemic in the country;

‘The supposed HIV seroprevalence rates in the Republic of South Africa exceed all plausible limits of heterosexual HIV transmission,’ states Jennings.

He continues that the ‘scale and scope of the epidemic have been grossly distorted in the RSA and other indigent, tropical settings’, suggesting that ‘theoretically, the heterosexual African black men of the Republic of South Africa would have to sleep with 5 – 20 times as many sex partners as the gay men of NYC in order to instigate a geometrical AIDS growth pattern equalling that in the United States at the start of the AIDS epidemic’, re-iterating that the global epicentre for the disease remains New York City.

Whilst it is hugely important to maintain an accurate grasp on seropravalance, there is also the risk that these explicit statements may feed the arguements of ‘AIDS denialists’ in the country. For many years under Thabo Mbeki’s presidency, the prevalence of HIV was widely disputed at high levels of government, with dietary remedies recommended over anti-retroviral drugs. Accurate data is crucial in the successful treatment of the disease and healthcare provision in the county, so it is hoped any policy changes following this research will serve to benefit the sufferers.

www.healthalert.net

The fiery and calculatingly controversial Malema is now facing his second disciplinary hearing within the ANC in just over a year. In 2010, he was disciplined and warned about future pronouncements after open criticism of President Jacob Zuma and open support for Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Now, Malema has been accused by the ANC of ‘sowing divisions’ in the party and bringing it into disrepute by calling for a change of government in neighbouring Botswana.

At a first, inconclusive hearing, there was violence outside the ANC HQ with T-shirts bearing President Zuma’s face burned and violent clashes between Malema supporters and the police. Suddenly, the growing split between the President and his one-time supporter and protégé is the dominant issue in South African politics. Does Zuma decide government policy or does Malema?

This is particularly crucial for foreign policy. South Africa is a superpower in African terms and, along with Nigeria and Egypt, effectively represents Africa on the world stage. With the ANC victory in 1994 and inauguration of Nelson Mandela as President, the country had huge moral force and influence – it punched above its weight internationally. Now it appears punch drunk.

The Botswana affair was an embarrassment for Zuma, but there has been no high profile refutation of Malema’s comments. The Gaborone government maintained a dignified silence at presidential and ministerial level, though presidential spokesman Jess Ramsay labelled Malema’s comments ‘utter garbage’ – particularly the youth leader’s charge that Botswana was going to allow the United States to have a base and perhaps the HQ of Africom (the US military Africa Command) in Botswana.

But Botswana is not the only foreign policy area where South Africa is on the ropes. Over Libya it appears out for the count. In February this year, South Africa voted for UN Security Council Resolution 1973 which allows the use of ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians and the enforcement of a no-fly zone. It was clear when it was passed that the resolution was the green light for Western air raids against Gaddafi’s military installations, airfields and armour. The resolution would be used and has been used to provide air and other combat support for the Libyan groups now represented in the Transitional National Council (TNC). If South Africa’s Foreign Affairs ministry, minister and diplomats did not realise what they were voting for, then it says little for the brains behind foreign policy.

Over the last few months, South African statements on Libya have been muddled and are now critical of the use of force under the resolution – this stance is based on the principles of the now more or less defunct New Partnership for African Development initiative (Nepad) (launched and championed in name but not often in action by Thabo Mbeki). The Zuma government criticised Western bombing and called for the formation of a transitional government representing all sides to the conflict – ignoring Gaddafi’s human rights abuses and the unelected nature of his regime. South Africa tried to block the unfreezing of Libyan funds by the UN to enable them to be used for humanitarian purposes, but dropped opposition after US Secretary of States Hilary Clinton brought pressure to bear.

Zuma has been under pressure inside South Africa from those who are pragmatic and want a foreign policy position on Libya that does not set it apart from much of Africa and the world and from those, like the ever vocal Malema, who want out and out support for Gaddafi and criticism of the rebels and the West. What has resulted is vacillation and confusion. South Africa’s leaders have been allies of Gaddafi since 1994. Mandela praised him for his support for liberation in Africa and successive governments have feted him – despite his upstaging of Mbeki at the inaugural African Union summit in Durban in July 2002. They chose to stress his anti-imperialist credentials ignoring his divisive role in Africa – such as his support for Idi Amin in Uganda, which led to war with Tanzania, his frequent and unprincipled swapping of sides in the Western Sahara or his invasions of and mercenary meddling in West Africa’s wars, including Sierra Leone, Liberia and Chad in the 1980s and 1990s.

Libyan policy has been an embarrassment for many South Africans, but then so was Zimbabwe. The growing repression and violence by Mugabe and ZANU-PF was tolerated for too long. But despite the more constructive role in bringing about the transitional government agreement between Mugabe and Tsvangirai, South Africa has done little to encourage greater democracy and, in April 2010, there conflicting signals when Malema visited Zimbabwe and flouted his own government’s policy by openly attacking Tsvangirai and the MDC. He was reprimanded but again policy was seen to be drifting rudderless and vulnerable to every passing wave.

One reason for this drift is that since 1994, there has not been a strong Foreign Minister in office. The succession of weak or sleeping ministers (Alfred Nzo, Nkosozana Dlamini Zuma and now Maite Nkoana-Mashabane) has deprived foreign policy of a voice. For a long time, this was ameliorated by the presence as Deputy Minister of the astute and experienced Aziz Pahad, who kept an eye on foreign policy for Mandela and Mbeki – Mbeki being the main architect of foreign policy under Mandela and then during his own presidency. Now he’s gone and so has any coherence in foreign policy.

During the Cold War, a comparison was once made of US and Soviet foreign policy. It was said to understand US policy you had to be able to play poker; for Soviet policy knowledge of chess was vital. What you need to understand South Africa’s policy is snakes and ladders.

Keith Somerville

A Thai national, Chemlong Lemlongthai, was arrested after work by South African police. Lemlongthai, 43, the leader of a Thailand-based rhino poaching syndicate, is implicated in poaching activity which has seen dozens of rhino horns being traded, with dozens more scheduled to be traded in the coming months. While shocking to conservationists and concerned citizens alike, the statistics are rendered even more unpalatable by the details of the practices of these syndicates. Reports have not only suggested the use of further canned hunts and the use of prostitutes in facilitating these, but also, sadly, that there appear to be a number of officials and apparently legitimate actors involved.

Evidence has come to light that over a quarter of the more than 200 rhinos killed for their horns this year were killed after provincial conservation authorities granted permission for these ‘hunts’. A self-styled South African ‘wildlife trader’ by the name of Marnus Steyl has also been implicated in buying and trading rhinos and providing them to poachers by means of these illegal ‘hunts’. Sickeningly, some of the apparent prostitutes involved, also Thai nationals wanted to answer charges of human trafficking, have apparently been paid to fill out official paperwork. These relate to international agreements contained in the ‘Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species’ and to take part in elaborate schemes to appear as if they had been hunting the rhinos legitimately. According to a statement, a South African Parks Official would also be present as a ‘witness’ to the hunt, paid a kickback in order to further legitimise the activities underway.

Shockingly, the rhino carcasses had then been processed and sold off in meat products to unsuspecting customers at an unnamed butchery in Vryburg. By this time the horns had been smuggled out of the country and via Thailand, where they would be sold to buyers in the Asian traditional medicine markets. Despite paying around R65, 000 per horn (a price about which he complained he was paying too much), Lemtongthai is thought to have earned around R60 million in profits from his trade in rhino horns to date.

Lemtongthai and Vixay Keovang of Vietnam, thought to be even higher up in the syndicate, have been able to carry out their business through the trading company, Xaysavang Trading Export-Import Company, based in Laos and also thought to be involved in the illegal sale of ivory and of laboratory animals to Chinese laboratories. In a bitter indictment of the state of progress in conservation matters, this same company is thought to have been previously involved in the sale of lion bones and carcasses provided by South African breeders.

In the late July report by the Mail & Guardian, provincial authorities and the Department of Environmental Affairs had still not answered questions posed by journalists of the publication regarding the high proportion of illegal rhino hunts ‘sanctioned’ by these bodies. The national Directorate for Priority Crimes Investigation, or ‘Hawks’, reported that their strategy to date was focused on the Kruger National Park area, but that once this area and strategy was thought to be under control that they would make further investigations and continue the poaching-related work they had been doing in other provinces.

These investigations of course come after the widely-publicised arrest of hunter Dawie Groenewald last September. Groenewald, released after his arrest on a R1 million bail, prompting fears of his fleeing the country, is the leader of a poaching syndicate which operated out of the Limpopo Province. He is facing a number of charges, including the charge of being involved in organised criminal activities. Groenewald has been linked by some to Lemthongthai and his smuggling activities.

Widespread evidence of poaching has come to light in the international media recently, with United States-based art dealer Victor Gordon having recently been arrested on charges of smuggling over a ton of ivory and selling it through his outlets in Philadelphia and elsewhere. In Kenya, President Mwai Kibaki has also recently made a public demonstration of burning five tons of confiscated illegal ivory in a show of determination to battle criminal networks. Analysis performed in Kenya suggested that the ivory had come mainly from Kenya and Tanzania.

Poaching is thus a problem of endemic proportion in sub-Saharan Africa, and the recent alarming exposure of officials in facilitating this criminal activity in the South African context is cause for concern. Although the Hawks have been quite effective in their investigations into the problem, an official position from the higher branches of government should be taken to crack down on and end illegal poaching in South Africa. Along with determined allies elsewhere facing the same problem, such as in Kenya, cooperation should be undertaken to share information and expertise in order to quell poaching activities. It is often said that you can tell a lot about a country by how it treats its most vulnerable, and certainly South Africa’s wildlife is among its most precious and yet exposed and vulnerable assets at the moment. In the U.S., ivory trader Victor Gordon faces up to 20 years if convicted, the threat of a similar sentence for offenders in South Africa and neighbouring countries would certainly make potential poachers think twice.

Readers – if you are concerned about the problem of rhino poaching in South Africa and elsewhere, why not join the group HELP our RHINO NOW! (H O R N) on Facebook – the group is a great source for information on developments relating to the above-mentioned and many other cases, and is a great place for networking with like-minded people. Online social networking such as this can play a vital role in the organising of social interests and in the democratic process, and is something New Africa Analysis is keen to encourage and practice.

Hamish Ross’ excellent book, ‘From SAS to Blood Diamond Wars’, reveals the exploits of Kauata ‘Fred’ Marafono, the Fijian ex SAS soldier who became involved in the 11 year rebel war in Sierra Leone. After a distinguished career in the elite British regiment, for which he was awarded the MBE, Fred, as he is widely known, was recruited by Simon Mann to join the South African private military company, Executive Outcomes, and in 1994 was sent to Sierra Leone as part of a contract with the Sierra Leone Government to fight the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels.

At that time the rebels, notorious for hacking off the arms and legs of their victims, were within forty kilometres of the capital, Freetown. All appeals for help from the Sierra Leone government to fellow African governments and to the international community had been turned down and the situation was critical. With less than 200 men, EO turned the war around. The government was able to re-assert its control over most of the country, including the rich diamond mining areas, as EO forced the rebels back towards the border with Liberia.

Notwithstanding the assertions that EO were mercenaries or ‘dogs of war’, to the people of Sierra Leone they were heroes, and when the incoming civilian government of President Tejan Kabbah terminated the contract with EO under pressure from the international community and on the insistence from the RUF as part of the Abidjan Peace Agreement, the people were fearful. They were right to be. Foday Sankoh, the infamous leader of the RUF, proved to be untrustworthy, and in alliance with the rebel Sierra Leone army, recommenced hostilities.

After the withdrawal of EO, Fred Marafono remained in Sierra Leone and helped the Defence Minister, Chief Sam Hinga Norman, to train the Civil Defence Forces, (CDF) – the traditional local militias, which represented the only indigenous forces loyal to President Kabbah, who sat in exile in neighbouring Conakry following his removal in the May 1997 coup. This time African governments did respond and through the regional African force, Ecomog, led by Nigeria, and assisted by the CDF, the rebels were again repulsed and the legitimate democratic government was restored. Fred had been recruited to form part of the ‘air wing’ of the government forces against the rebels. This comprised just one helicopter gunship flown by another ex EO South African pilot, Johann ‘Juba’ Joubert, with Fred manning the GPMG (General Purpose Machine Gun) through the open door of the Mi24. The exploits of Fred and Juba, and ‘Bokkie’, the nickname for the helicopter (named after the South African Springbok) became legendary in the fight against the rebels..

However, there was to be a further twist in the tale. The RUF rebels, backed by Charles Taylor in Liberia, reneged against the ill-conceived peace agreement, the Lome Peace Accord. This time the United Nations decided to take over from Ecomog but the UN force, the largest peacekeeping force in the world at that time, initially proved inadequate against the rebels and it took the deployment of British forces to stiffen its resolve. The elite British SAS were deployed and again Fred was on hand to assist the members of his former regiment.

In the SAS one talks of ‘crossing the river’ for someone. Throughout his time in Sierra Leone, Fred Marafono established a close bond with Sam Hinga Norman. He was someone Fred crossed the river for and Hamish Ross’ book is as much about Sam Norman as it is about Fred Marafano. Norman was another African in the Nelson Mandela mould who fought for the cause of justice, peace and democracy, and then found himself locked up for it. Hamish Ross’ book reveals much of the real truth of the man, very little of which emerged in his shameful trial as a war criminal by the Sierra Leone Special Court. While some observers cite Charles Taylor’s indictment as a positive example of international justice, Sam Norman’s arrest and untimely and peculiar death in detention remains a huge blot on the Sierra Leone story.

Hamish Ross’ book also helps to present a more balanced view of the activities of companies like Executive Outcomes. Ten years on, the labels mercenaries or private military companies no longer have the same negative connotation. Governments around the world are coming to terms with accepting the positive roles that PMCs can and do play in conflicts. A British Foreign Office official has been quoted as saying that ‘Private military security companies play a vital and necessary role in hostile environments.’ Attention is now focussed upon controlling such companies rather than trying to ban them. Last year the Swiss Government hosted the signing of the ‘International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’. The aim of the code is to set out measurable and enforceable standards by which such companies operate. Some governments have yet to catch up with this change of attitude. The South African government, for example, enacted its Foreign Military Assistance Act specifically to prescribe the activities of Executive Outcomes. It needs revising. Although the Act has never been tested in Court, in the words of one practitioner, ‘it makes even selling shoelaces to the Angolan army illegal!’

PMCs have now been actively involved in all the latest conflicts such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. In Afghanistan alone last year they were paid contracts worth £29 million. This is clearly a lucrative business, but still more economic than deploying regular armies. When EO was operating in Sierra Leone, it was costing approximately $20 million per year. When the UN deployed its force to do in effect the same thing, it cost one billion dollars!

Peter Penfold

‘From SAS to Blood Diamond Wars’, Hamish Ross and Fred Marafano, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2011.

Mandela, who has not appeared at a public engagement since the closing ceremony of the football World Cup in July 2010, is spending the day in Qunu, a small rural village in South Africa’s Eastern Cape Province, where he grew up.

U.N General Secretary Ban Ki-moon, said: ‘Together, the best way we can thank Nelson Mandela for his work is by taking action for others and inspiring change.’

The people of South Africa are honouring the ex-president’s efforts to bring together a nation divided by apartheid in a range of different activities throughout the country.

Nearly12 million school pupils located all across the country sang together in unison a Happy Birthday song which was composed for the special occasion.

‘Bikers for Mandela’, a group of volunteers, rode around South Africa in eight days to undertake volunteer services such as planting trees and painting playgrounds. Their trip was scheduled to end in Pretoria on Mandela Day.

US first lady Michelle Obama, who is currently touring Africa together with her two daughters and mother, met Mandela the day before his birthday. The US President family was shown around by former first lady Graca Machel, the wife of Nelson Mandela, and was invited home to a private meeting with the liberation legend even after a visit to the Apartheid Museum.

Michelle Obama told reporters that Mandela ‘looked good, seemed strong, yes he was happy, and it was good to see.’ They were also to have a tour of the infamous prison island, Robben Island, where Mandela was in jail for 27 years.

Mandela, who has been receiving follow-up treatment for an acute respiratory infection since he was released from hospital in January, was under South Africa’s apartheid regime imprisoned for 27 years after being convicted of sabotage and attempts to overthrow the government. He was released in 1990 and became president in 1994. He is today a world-wide symbol of freedom.

The allies and the UN have previously joined with the opposition in forcefully voicing their opinion that such an agreement would mean Gaddafi leaving the country. There have also been calls to press for him to be tried at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for his crimes against the Libyan people. Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, has however expressed his view that he and his father would ‘die in Libya’, and previous agreements involving all the players concerned, including Zuma and the African Union, have come to naught, with violence continuing unabated.

Zuma thus faced a huge test, seen as crucial to his status as a statesman on the international stage. Public opinion in Europe and elsewhere is inflamed, with many doubting the potential effectiveness of these talks, and some suggesting that Zuma’s credibility as a negotiator is already in question – one has only to read the comments sections of websites reporting on the issue to see some of the vitriol now being directed at him. Indeed, in the last communique for the previous failed AU/Libya peace negotiations, the mood of reverence for the ‘elder statesman’ and established Pan-Arabist/Pan-Africanist Gaddafi was clear – with the Libyan being cited as a ‘brother leader’, the idea of an old alliance was kept alive. The latest announcement, seen as unacceptable by rebels, means that Zuma’s job is not finished and he will have to remain at the table and push the negotiations further.

By taking on the role, Zuma is taking on a lot. He has to contend with fairly widespread public opinion that the allied attack on Gaddafi is justified and in the interests of democracy, and the corollary that many are calling for the attacks to continue until the threat from Gaddafi is eliminated, and the Libyan leader ‘taken out’. A sense of vindication for this course of action will undoubtedly arise out of the recent killing of Osama bin Laden, which can be argued to help situate the mission against Gaddafi in a more favourable context as a fight against the enemies of democracy. Although in the Bin Laden case there were some voices in the West which asked whether it was right to eliminate the al-Qaeda leader, apart from voices loyal to Gaddafi the question has not yet been widely asked in Western media whether his persecution and elimination is prudent. The mood is indeed one of retribution. In this context, Zuma’s taking on the role of mediator has almost inevitably resulted in questions being asked about his motives – the old arguments about his credibility arising originally during his court case for allegations of corruption, rape and other crimes are being touted again by commentators.

Given the failure of the AU delegation to come up with a solution during the last talks, not to mention their ill-placed adulation of Gaddafi, and the additional and perhaps inevitable questions being asked of Zuma as a result of his opening himself up to scrutiny over his now internationally prominent position, it might be asked whether his efforts are indeed wise. To this, it might be argued that they certainly appear brave. It might be suggested, that with his role during the last talks, and his position as leader of one of the most powerful member-states of the AU, that they are necessary. While a weaker position would thus suggest that Zuma should therefore act on this momentum, and benefit from being seen to be actively pursuing a peace accord, whatever the outcome, this is not the kind of argument that Zuma or the South African public should even seek to countenance. A kind of watered-down realpolitik, the only aim of which is to ‘save face’ for all sides concerned, may wash in the murkier dealings of South African politics, but on a world stage it simply won’t do. On the South African scene in particular, the case of South African journalist Anton Hammerl, killed by forces loyal to Gaddafi, has captured public opinion. Zuma was called upon to return the journalist’s body home to his family, and take appropriate action on the killing. News reports from the talks suggest that this specific question has not yet been answered, and the Zuma camp should be made to know that this is not good enough.

The South African president, then, needed to have pushed strongly for a democratically respected resolution. While he and everyone else stands to gain from as peaceful a solution as is possible, this must be tempered by an insistence that Gaddafi step down not only from power, but from his demands. Gaddafi has discredited himself as a political leader, and any vestiges of Pan-Africanist respect for him are ill-founded – an argument that has been made elsewhere in this publication. Zuma and the AU contingent are the leaders here who should be making the demands and Gaddafi the concessions.

At the same time, the apparent baying for blood in some quarters of the ostensibly democratic West is equally unwise, and democracy would stand to benefit more from Gaddafi going on trial and the rule of law prevailing than on another judicially ambiguous killing. A trial would of course restore the discourse of reason and justice to a situation that is already in danger of becoming unbalanced by the arbitrary assertions of power on both sides. Gaddafi is not likely to agree to leaving Libya for what he and his supporters will argue to be a ‘show trial’ – indeed, it is doubtful whether he will want to be tried for what he will suppose to be his right to use force anyway – but Zuma and the AU should be strong and push for a tough resolution.

This being considered, the case should be made for Gaddafi to leave Libya and in the event of him going into exile, he should be held under secure conditions while the task of democratisation in Libya is underway. The prerogative of his people to see justice and see him tried should be maintained for the future, but the more pressing issue of restoring peace to Libya should take priority. Gaddafi’s call for ‘all Libyans to be given a chance to talk among themselves’ is ironically exactly what should happen, but without Gaddafi, who has through his willingness to use violence discredited himself from the process of democratic discussion.

The issue is, then, a test of the mettle of African leaders. It is also a stark test of democracy, on and for the African continent, and also for the world stage. Libyan Deputy Foreign Minister Khalid Kaim has stated that; ‘we are an African country. Any initiative outside the AU framework will be rejected’. The pressure is on, then, for the AU to push through a framework which insists on democracy. Democracy should be seen to prevail, and to pass the test of governance for the people. Meeting this condition, and subsequently setting democratic ideals as the prior condition to all further AU negotiations, will strengthen the body and its standing, not to mention the future of its member states, immeasurably.

Jacob Zuma is standing up to this challenge, and he should work hard to score every point he can. The announcements from his May talks have been decried as unacceptable by the opposition, who as the acceptable voice of Libyans must be heeded. This is more than a point of reputation for Zuma, although it has the potential to do a lot for his standing. The downside of failure can, however, not be counted in the reputations of individual leaders, but in terms of human lives. This is why a concerted push for democracy must be made, and then agreed upon – anything else would be a victory for tyranny.

The campaign itself was a lively one, with typically outlandish claims made on all sides, and parties shown up more than once for poor service delivery in their respective provinces. Indeed, service delivery was probably the main theme of the campaign, with opposition parties zeroing in on the ruling ANC’s service delivery record and its shortcomings. The ANC, for its part, pointed to shoddy service delivery in areas run by other parties, and its leaders, including President Zuma, admitted that mistakes had been made and that voter sentiment on service delivery meant the issue must be taken seriously.

Many analysts predicted that voters would be apathetic, due to dissatisfaction with candidates. However, officials from the electoral body expressed their confidence that the turnout would be higher than in previous years (‘06 results showed 48% of registered voters turned up to choose their candidates). At the latest reckoning, turnout for this election was set at 57% – the highest yet for such an election in the country. Regionally, the highest turnout was in the Western Cape, at 64.9%, with Limpopo’s turnout, although at the bottom end with 44.31%, still not much less than the last election’s national average.

An apparent 2 billion people tuned into Britain’s Royal Wedding Celebrations on Friday 29th April, watching Prince William and Kate Middleton tie the knot in what was said to be an ‘understated’ and yet elegant and glamorous affair. While it is difficult to get true figures as to the economic costs and benefits of the wedding, predictable displeasure was voiced by UK taxpayers and media as to exactly who would be footing the bill.

Not to be outdone, South Africa’s very own showman head of state, Jacob Zuma, decided to organise a wedding for his daughter Duduzile, for her marriage to businessman Lonwabo Sambudla. Seemingly equally glamorous, the tastes displayed were perhaps less elegant than decadent, with 12 Lamborghinis in the procession rather than boring old limousines, and the pre-wedding party, hosted by wellknown club owner Kenny Kunene, sporting scantily clad women lucky enough to have champagne drank right off their bodies. No Pippa Middleton style praise for these ladies’ fashion sense then.

The Zuma ceremony was reported to cost R3 million. While undoubtedly the president put on a good show, pipping Britain to the spectacle by holding the ceremony 6 days earlier on the 23rd April, any similar gains in the economic or national pride stakes are difficult to see. Displeasure might be voiced by the South African taxpayer too. With Duduzile having 21 siblings, if Jacob Zuma decided to throw a royal wedding for all of them, the cost (including for Duduzile) would come out at R66 million. That’s just a fraction above the reported R65 million Zuma was said to have spent on renovations to his house in Nkandla. Add to this the annual cost of supporting Zuma’s wives, said to be R15.5 million, and there is cause for concern. Zuma spokespeople have in the past claimed that the president’s spending is a personal malter, and is largely self-funded. In this case, the above spending of R83.5 million must mean that the president earns a huge amount.

However, according to figures from parliament, the president earns R2 .25 million a year. The surplus of R81 ,25 million is quite impressive, and means that as well as his duties as president and efforts as political entertainer, Jacob Zuma must be a canny investor and businessman to be earning that kind of money while the rest of the country is recovering from recession, and recent reports from Stats SA showing a 25% unemployment rate in the country. Carrying on the theme of the royal Zuma bloodline, it was reported recently that Duduzane Zuma, Jacob Zuma’s 28 year old son, was soon to become South Africa’s youngest billionaire (presumably, then, that means he will have to pay for his own wedding?).

Clearer and more thorough arguments have been made elsewhere as to the invidious nature of what has been jokingly dubbed ZEE – or ‘Zuma Economic Empowerment’ – in a cynical twist on the country’s intended policy of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). With over 50% of black youth unemployed, and presumably without Duduzane’s pension or share options, the plans to empower the previously powerless are presumably either on hold or are just not being made a priority by Zuma’s ANC government.

Making a comparison with another country with an equally controversial and showmanlike leader is illustrative. Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi is not only his country’s Prime Minister, but is also one of its richest people. Like Zuma, he courts controversy with his various affairs with women (unlike Zuma, he doesn’t marry them), apparently shady business deals (also involving various court and corruption cases) and even shadier business connections (wry parenthetical comment excluded for safety reasons). However, while Zuma’s South Africa faces an unemployment rate of 25% and per capita income of US $10000, Italy can hardly be said to languishing in relative poverty, with its unemployment rate at 8.3% and per capita income at US $31 ,000, Italy’s CGI or ‘redundancy fund’ also ensures that the unemployed get money to ensure a social safety net in order to meet their basic needs.

The moral of the story, in a story with few morals, is that there are those who try to distract their populations from their plundering lifestyles with showmanship and illusion, but there are certain conditions beyond which it is unbearable for a suffering people to take it any more. While British citizens and taxpayers may well complain about funding the weddings and lifestyles of their royals, it  is true that they generate at least some tourism revenues for their country. Without implying that Zuma and his familiesm various business interests do not bring in foreign investments into various mining and other concerns, it is not a cynical question to ask just how much of that is actually seen by South Africans outside of Zuma’s magic circle and the various investors in their companies. It is cynical how there is so much wealth in the country and it is simply lining the pockets and Lamborghinis of the few – South Africa voted against that sort of arrangement in 1994, and its citizens are in no mood for going back.